The strategic cost of Israel’s endless wars

A displaced Palestinian inspects the damage to his home in Gaza City’s southern Al-Zeitoun on Feb. 9, 2025. (AFP)

Speaking at a conference organized by the Ministry of Defense, the Israeli army’s new chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, last week said 2025 would be “a year of combat.”

The exact sentence, translated from Hebrew, was: “The year 2025 will continue to be a year of combat.” The word “continue” is crucial, suggesting that Israel will resume its wars, despite the ceasefire agreements it signed with the Lebanese government in November and Palestinian groups in January. In other words, it seems that Zamir is signaling that Israel will reopen these two fronts, even in the face of the ceasefire deals.

Despite Israel’s insatiable appetite for war, it is hard to imagine what the Israeli army could achieve through renewed violence, when it previously failed to accomplish its objectives over nearly 14 months in Lebanon and more than 15 months in Gaza.

Israel launched thousands of airstrikes on Lebanon, destroying entire towns and villages and killing and wounding thousands. It also dropped more than 85,000 tonnes of bombs on Gaza during its genocide, killing and wounding more than 170,000 people. Despite this, Israel failed on both fronts. In Gaza, Hamas alone reportedly managed to recruit between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters during Israel’s 471 days of relentless warfare.

Furthermore, the return of nearly 1 million Palestinians to northern Gaza has reset Israel’s so-called tactical or strategic achievements. These efforts, aimed at depopulating northern Gaza to create a permanent military buffer zone, have been reversed by the population’s return since the ceasefire came into effect.

The war also came at a staggering cost to the Israeli army. Ironically, during the same Ministry of Defense conference, Zamir revealed the actual costs of Israel’s wars on Gaza and Lebanon. He stated that the ministry “now provides care for 5,942 new bereaved family members,” adding that the “Rehabilitation Department has taken in over 15,000 wounded service members, many bearing both physical and mental scars from the war.”

These figures were not broken down by category or war front and did not include casualties from Oct. 7, 2023, to the end of that year. However, they represent the highest estimate of Israeli casualties provided to date, raising the question: can Israel afford to return to war?

Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who was dismissed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last November, offered clues about Israel’s military crisis during an interview on Channel 12. Gallant recalled a conversation he had with Netanyahu after the Hamas assault on the Gaza Envelope in southern Israel in 2023. “The prime minister told me that we would see thousands of dead in the offensive in Gaza. I told him: ‘We will not see thousands of dead,’” Gallant said. However, Zamir’s numbers have now validated Netanyahu’s estimates, not Gallant’s.

Another early fear of Netanyahu was that “Hezbollah will destroy everything if we hit it,” referring to the city of Tel Aviv. While that prediction did not fully materialize, the stalemate in Lebanon ensures Israel will remain haunted by similar fears.

If all war fronts officially end, Netanyahu’s government will collapse; but if he returns to active war, he will fail to claim any decisive victories

Ramzy Baroud

So, will 2025 be a year of combat for Israel?

Netanyahu faces a two-pronged challenge: if all war fronts officially end, his government will collapse; but if he returns to active war, he will fail to claim any decisive victories.

It is possible that Zamir’s “year of combat” doctrine is aimed at saving face — projecting strength without reopening major war fronts. Israel may continue to create crises in Gaza and Lebanon without fully engaging in war, perhaps by delaying scheduled withdrawals, adding new demand,s and so on.

But this may not be enough for Netanyahu to stay in power, especially in the face of growing public dissatisfaction. This is where “Iron Wall,” Israel’s ongoing military operation in the West Bank, comes into play.

Though Israel has launched numerous raids in the West Bank, the campaign that was launched on Jan. 21 was directly linked to the war in Gaza. It began two days after the latest ceasefire came into effect, signaling that a large deployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank was meant to offset the reduced combat in Gaza.

It also served to distract from Israel’s sense of failure in Gaza, as described by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who quit Netanyahu’s coalition government on Jan. 19.

The campaign in the West Bank centered on the refugee camp of Jenin, has used tactics similar to those employed in Gaza. Tens of thousands have been displaced from Jenin, Tulkarm,and other northern West Bank regions, while hundreds have been killed, wounded or had their homes demolished. The Israeli army seems to be attempting to compensate for its failure to ethnically cleanse Gaza by displacing entire communities in the West Bank.

If Israel persists in making 2025 a “year of combat” focused on the West Bank, the consequences could be dire, especially for an army that has already suffered unprecedented losses on multiple fronts.

If Israel continues on this path, an all-out uprising may become imminent and new, unexpected fronts could open up simultaneously.

Israel must be reined in. It is acting like a wounded animal and, in doing so, it continues to kill Palestinians in the name of security while destabilizing the entire Middle East. Netanyahu must be stopped.

• Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and author. He is editor of The Palestine Chronicle and nonresident senior research fellow at the Center for Islam and Global Affairs. His latest book, co-edited with Ilan Pappe, is “Our Vision for Liberation: Engaged Palestinian Leaders and Intellectuals Speak Out.” X: @RamzyBaroud