Analysis | So You Don’t Like the Two-state Solution? Meet the One-state Model

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas holding up a map while speaking at the United Nations Security Council last year in New York City.Credit: JOHANNES EISELE / AFP

The conventional wisdom in Israel in the last decade has been that the “two-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer an attainable or even a desirable option. This is so much the case that the issue has all but evaporated from the international agenda and public interest, and in four straight Israeli elections from 2019 to 2021, the “Palestinian issue” was conspicuously absent from almost all the parties’ campaigns.

 
Critics and analysts, regardless of whether they support this model, have concluded that due to a confluence of reasons, the two-state model isn’t viable, feasible or sustainable.

 
According to this analysis, Israel and the Palestinians are asymmetrically entwined and simply can’t decouple into two sovereign political entities in a way that would satisfy Israeli security concerns and Palestinian national aspirations.

There is no territorial contiguity that would enable a functioning Palestinian state; such a state would have no economic sustainability if detached from Israel; and it would lack reasonable governability.

 
The Israeli mind-set is that under existing conditions, a Palestinian state would be a failed state from the start, and the cost of addressing the multitude of problems that would inevitably crop up would far outweigh the pitfalls of the status quo.

 
Since 2014 and then-Secretary of State John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy – the last major initiative to relaunch a two-state peace process based on the so-called Clinton Parameters – there has been a long hiatus. The Palestinians, claiming there is no such thing as a status quo here because the occupation is a dynamic and expanding reality, threatened to “internationalize” the conflict by appealing to the United Nations and requesting recognition as a state.

 
Israel occasionally comes up with half-baked ideas of “managing the conflict,” “bottom-up economic peace” or the more current and fashionable “shrinking the conflict” by reducing the friction created by the occupation. But neither side is seriously thinking about a long-term settlement.

Enter the daunting concept of the “one-binational-state solution.” On the face of it, the idea is simple: Since a division into two sovereign states seems untenable, Israelis and Palestinians will share one binational state. This can be done in one of two ways: mutual consent or an acrimonious political confrontation.

 
A majority of Israelis and all Israeli governments of all political denominations have been quick to reject any idea of a binational state. Israel is “democratic and Jewish.” A binational state is the end of the Zionist enterprise if the Palestinians are enfranchised. But if they aren’t, Israel ceases to be a democracy and effectively becomes an apartheid state.

 

Then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointing at a map of West Bank settlements when presenting his annexation plan, ahead of Israel's 2019 election.Credit: Tomer Appelbaum

In fact, the worst-case scenario in Israeli thinking is the Palestinian Authority dissolving itself, citing a lack of any political future, with Israel becoming the de facto sovereign of the West Bank and possibly Gaza too. The next natural step would be for the Palestinians to demand annexation and seek the right of “one person, one vote.”

Israeli politicians live in deep denial over this scenario. Military planners acknowledge the plausibility of it in the not-so-distant future. But if the two-state model isn’t viable and the binational state model is unacceptable, what then? There are three basic options.

 
1. A tripartite Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation

 
In very general terms, Jordan would have two parliaments: one in Amman and one for the Palestinians in Ramallah or the outskirts of East Jerusalem. There would be an integrated economy and an Israeli security regime in the West Bank.

 
But that’s short of the independent state the Palestinians want, and crucially, there are no indications that the Hashemite kingdom is interested in such a regime-threatening structure.

 
2. An international protectorate

 
The West Bank and Gaza would be administered by an international group involving the United Nations and NATO, or one would be established specifically for this task. Postwar Germany and Japan, Guam and most recently Kosovo have all been under such a regime.

 
The Palestinians would have a silver lining: a state that, say, for 10 years would be managed by an international alliance. This would be a build-operate-transfer plan that would allow Israel to stay present militarily and vacate quadrants according to a timetable.

 
While this may appeal to anyone disillusioned with the two-state model and apprehensive about the binational one, it’s hard to see the world between 2022 and 2025 enlisting to such an endeavor.

 
3. One state

 
There are several models for this, none of which have been thoroughly explored, until now.

 
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, a former army colonel, international lawyer and legal counsel to Israel’s negotiators during several stages of the peace process, has published an illuminating, methodical and impartial study on the various one-state models.

 
She analyzes four possible structures of a one-state formula: a unitary state; a state with Palestinian territorial autonomy; a federal or “federative” state; and a confederation. She then applies 18 parameters to each model and examines their feasibility.

 

A banner in Ramallah supporting the creation of a single state for Israelis and Palestinians. It states: "If I had to choose between one state and two states, I would choose the one state."Credit: Nasser Nasser/AP

The demographic angle

 
Before reviewing the pros and cons of the four models, it’s critical to understand Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab demography. It’s the foundation of any political settlement, and it’s not useful to rely on wishful-thinking demographic figures or the Bible.

 
One of the beautiful things about demographics is that they’re not amenable to political manipulation or historical narratives. You can toy with some numbers and finagle others, but you can only manipulate data on the margins.

 
The figures below are relevant to mid-2021 and are based on the numbers from both the Israeli and Palestinian statistics bureaus, the UN and the CIA.

 
From the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west, there are roughly 14 million people. Some conservative estimates put the figure at just under 13 million. The gap can be attributed to the Palestinians conveniently counting Jerusalem residents twice and not subtracting Palestinians who have left for other countries.

 
That’s for a different article. What’s critical is that the gap, though around some 500,000 people, doesn’t significantly affect the general balance.

 
There are 9.4 million people on the Israeli side of the Green Line, the armistice demarcation line before the 1967 Six-Day War that separates Israel and the West Bank.

 
Some 6.9 million, or 74.2 percent, are Israeli Jews. Some 1.93 million citizens, or 21 percent, are Palestinian Arabs, commonly referred to as Israeli Arabs – a convenient reference that omits the word Palestinian. The 1.9-million figure includes the 350,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem.

 
In the West Bank – Judea and Samaria – there are 2.5 million Palestinians. So, for the purposes of understanding the demography of the one-state models, there are 4.43 million Palestinians (2.5 million in the West Bank and 1.93 million in Israel proper) and 6.9 million Israeli Jews. The combined number of inhabitants is thus 11.3 million. That translates to 60 percent Jewish and 40 percent Palestinian. The 60-40 ratio isn’t ideal, but it’s manageable, right? Wrong. Very wrong.

 
Because there’s Gaza. Remember Gaza? If you don’t, it has a nasty habit of reminding Israel of its existence every year or two. Gaza has anywhere between 1.8 million and 2 million people. For the sake of this analysis, let’s say 1.9 million.

 
So, the total population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea now increases to 13.2 million. It may not look like much, but the demographic balance changes dramatically. With the addition of Gaza, the ratio of Jews to Palestinian Arabs is now about 52.2 percent to 47 percent.

 
This is effectively a demographic equilibrium of two similar-sized ethno-national communities suffering more than 100 years of enmity and conflict.

 
Does demographic equilibrium preclude a one-state solution? That obviously depends on political developments, but it surely casts an ominous cloud of unviability on the model. This would suggest a certain degree of urgency, particularly from Israel, which thoroughly rejects this model. The complacent “there is no partner” approach doesn’t enshrine the status quo; rather, it hastens the one-state model becoming the reality-based default option.

 
The method is in the metrics

 
The study applies 18 parameters to each of the four models of the one-state formula. Some are quantifiable, like economy, geography and demography. Some are derived from the experience of decades of failed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Others relate to the historical context and ideological attributes of two national liberation movements.

 
Together, they assess the viability of each model. These are the parameters:

 
1. Territorial division

 
2. Status of the settlements

 
3. Status of Jerusalem

 
4. Aspects of citizenship and residency

 
5. Governmental authority

 
6. Palestinian involvement in government

 
7. Freedom of movement within the state

 
8. The refugee issue

 
9. Security aspects

 
10. Social aspects

 
11. Economic and civil aspects

 
12. Preserving the Jewish character of the state

 
13. Maintaining the democratic and liberal character of the state

 
14. Implications for Israel’s Arab citizens

 
15. Implications for the Palestinian Authority

 
16. The Gaza Strip

 
17. Execution of the model

 
18. Feasibility of achieving the model

 
What do these parameters produce in terms of the models? Not much.

 
A unitary state

 
This is basically the binational state alluded to earlier. Israel can’t conceivably live with a 40 percent (without Gaza) Palestinian super-minority, certainly not if the Palestinians get to vote. The Palestinians will not willfully integrate into a state that defines itself as a Jewish state or the state of the Jews or the national homeland of the Jewish people. The economic gaps are tremendous. The viability of this model is therefore zero.

 
A state with Palestinian autonomy

 
This effectively means an incorporation of the West Bank into Israel, with Palestinian municipal, educational and health-system autonomy. This model is based on Palestinian consent, which is highly unlikely. It falls far short of Palestinian national aspirations, which would lead to resistance and dissent. From an Israeli perspective and security interests, it perpetuates the military occupation and mitigates nothing.

 
A federal state

 
The core idea is that the land and the population are divided into two federative units (or cantons) based on homogeneous ethno-demography, rather than a politically demarcated border. But how is the central – federal – government structured? Is it 60-40? Who makes security decisions?

 
Such a division creates numerous friction points, whether political, economic, administrative, security, transportation or budgetary. Viability here is thus very questionable and based on a wealth of trust, goodwill and cooperation, commodities in severe shortage.

 
A confederation

 
Unlike the tripartite confederation with Jordan, this model is essentially composed of two states, a clearly delineated border along the Green Line, freedom of movement, no population relocations and one economy.

 
This model does not lack problems and potential rifts: friction between the Palestinians and settlements, border security and Jerusalem. But it’s the most viable of the four.

 
The paradox is that it’s the most viable of the one-state models precisely because it closely resembles the two-state model: maximum disassociation and political disengagement. If this is the case, why not explore this as a first phase of a future two-state arrangement?

 
The answer, tragically, is that governments only make the right decision after they’ve exhausted every other possibility.