A Historic Hamas-US Deal – What are Its Potential Implications?

US President Donald Trump and the spokesperson for the Al-Qassam Brigades, Abu Obeida. (Design: Palestine Chronicle)

Taken at face value, the deal between the United States and Hamas represents a baffling historic policy pivot, not only from the Trump administration’s hardline Zionist position that appeared ironclad only weeks ago, but would be the most significant Palestine-Israel shift in Washington since 1967.

While crowds have gathered in Gaza to celebrate, others watched on with cautious optimism.

This Sunday’s announcement from the Palestinian Resistance movement Hamas, that they had not only been dealing once again with US President Donald Trump’s negotiating team, but that they had struck an agreement to release American-Israeli soldier, Edan Alexander, from captivity, sent shockwaves across the region.

According to the Hamas movement, the US has agreed to allow humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip after Israel decided to cut it off completely in mid-March and that they were awaiting an announcement from Washington that would signal the beginning of intensive negotiations aimed at reaching a lasting ceasefire.

Israeli Hebrew media then slowly began releasing details relevant to the deal, while Abu Obeida, the spokesperson for the Al-Qassam Brigades, confirmed that Monday will be the day when the captured Israeli soldier – who is an American citizen – will be released.

Some Hebrew media outlets indicated the US has requested that Israel adhere to a temporary ceasefire in order to allow for the release of Alexander, while Axios claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was previously notified of the agreement. Finally Trump weighed in and confirmed the deal was taking place.

As has become a general rule when it comes to Donald Trump’s announcements and deals, it is best not to jump the gun before seeing tangible results first. It could so happen that the Hamas-US deal fails, especially given the possibility of Israel taking measures which kill the agreement before it enters into effect.

What Is Really Going On?

Not unlike Trump’s other international diplomatic moves, the current state of play leaves analysts with difficult jobs. Do we employ Occam’s Razor and assume the obvious, or is the American President up to some broader agenda that is being shrouded in obscurity?

The first and most obvious way to interpret the sudden Hamas-US deal is to view in parcel with the range of claims – mostly originating in the Israeli Hebrew-language media – that the American President is sick of Netanyahu.

This would lead us to believe that at least some of the rumors surrounding what Trump is going to announce this week are true, including that he could recognize a Palestinian State, that he will force a ceasefire deal on Israel and is no longer putting the interests of Tel Aviv above those of the United States.

If we put this together with the sudden halt of US military operations against Yemen, the firing of Mike Waltz and alleged severing of communications with Netanyahu, this appears to show the White House is turning against Israel.

However, this kind of thinking, although understandable, falls short of the mark for anyone with a memory that goes back just a month. In fact, every few months or so during the previous Biden administration, a sudden series of leaks would emerge claiming that the US President “hung up the phone” on Netanyahu, or swore at him and that both leaders were constantly clashing. It is pretty clear at this point that all of this was theater, meant to buy more time for Israel and the US.

There has to be something more happening behind the scenes which has led to such a dramatic series of announcements. Whether that is a Trump-Netanyahu personality clash, or a sinister plot that is brewing.

Every senior official in Trump’s government is outwardly pro-Israel and is affiliated with the Israel Lobby in the United States, not only this, but the Trump campaign was bankrolled by openly Zionist billionaires. The incentive therefore, for such a policy shift, has to come from somewhere.

If the incentive is just a clash between Netanyahu and Trump, then this would mean that the American leader is willing to suddenly perform a 180 degree shift and take on the Israel Lobby in Washington, based upon the dislike of the Israeli prime minister alone. This may be the kind of actor Trump is portrayed as on broadcast media, but this is not actually how his Middle East policy works.

In the event that there is a genuine change in attitude towards Netanyahu, what could be the case is that a segment of the Israel Lobby, aligned with the Israeli opposition and intelligence agencies, has decided to perform a kind of coup against the Israeli Prime Minister.

This is a much more plausible explanation of what we could be seeing, that Netanyahu has sufficiently aggravated the figures within the Israeli political and military elite that they have decided to team up with their Lobby allies in Washington to oust Netanyahu.

This would actually be a smart move from the Zionist perspective, as the Israeli prime minister is now inflicting ruin on the Zionist project with his irrational coalition partners. Yet, if this is true, it could make Netanyahu extremely dangerous, specifically when it comes to Iran. If he feels as if the end of his reign in power is near, the Israeli prime minister could choose to strike the Iranian nuclear program.

For more perspective on what this scenario could look like and why this could turn into an attack on Iran, whether the US and Israel are jointly manufacturing good-cop bad-cop theatrics or not, my analysis piece from yesterday covers it at some length. In short summary, Netanyahu could see an attack on Iran as his way out of the current crises he faces, while the US could see a controlled conflict with Iran as a strategic move that allows for closing multiple fronts in the ongoing regional war.

There is a chance here that everything we are hearing about the Netanyahu-Trump split is simply theater. The purpose of this would be to give the public the illusion that the US is against any conflict with Tehran, but had been dragged into it against its will.

If we are to use this approach to viewing the recent developments, there’s two separate scenarios under this line of thinking. The first being that a major US-Israeli assault is coming that will blow up into a catastrophic regional conflagration, where the theatre serves as a trick that helps the Americans land their first blows. This does not appear likely. The second is that the US will perform a support role in favor of Israel, perhaps including direct attacks against Iran and attempting to combat Hezbollah’s potential reaction to the scenario.

Regardless of what elements of the alleged Netanyahu-Trump row are true, most of which have now been denied by the US’ ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, the possibility of an attack on Tehran is still very much high.

If Israel attacks Iran in a major way, Hezbollah has a historic opportunity, as I outlined in my previous analysis piece. Yet, if the US has removed Hamas from the equation, the Lebanese group will likely be more reserved in its actions.

This is why I have repeatedly argued that Hamas is the real wildcard in this conflict, as it is in the most dire situation and therefore could take dramatic decisions that nobody else would dare risk.

Without Hamas fighting on the southern front, Hezbollah will likely choose to liberate Lebanese territory and not make a decision to go any further. Yet, if Hamas decides to do something big, it is a possibility that Hezbollah will choose to enter northern occupied Palestine.

The US Trump administration understands this is a possibility and that the Israeli military could not deal with such a scenario, especially if Iranian missile attacks were limiting their air force’s effectiveness. So, ending the war on the Gaza front could avoid a situation under which Israel will face an existential threat on the ground.

Hezbollah recapturing and asserting its control over southern Lebanon would be a major prestige restoring victory for the group. On the other hand, Israel could emerge from a limited war that involves Hezbollah and Iran, battered but still standing, making various claims about victory that only their people will truly buy. Therefore, Tel Aviv could try to explain away its loss to Hezbollah and focus its efforts on its plots in either Syria and/or the West Bank.

Afterall, the situation along the Lebanese border would simply return to what it was prior to October 7, 2023, so it’s not like the Israeli public will be up in arms about the loss for long.

Meanwhile, if you look at the Arab Gulf States, it appears as if the US has greatly beefed up air defenses and moved in new military assets to the region, but the likes of Saudi Arabia are making strides towards tighter relations with Tehran. This is likely born out of a desire to ensure that any Iranian retaliations in a future conflict, involving the US, will spare them.

All of what is mentioned above deals with a series of hypothetical situations, each crucial to consider going forward. Yet, it appears as if there needs to be an escalation that forces this multi-front war to close, because each front has the potential to explode at any moment.

Israel is now fixated on the annexation of more territory, it has a militaristic outlook, but its ground force is incapable of fighting on multiple fronts and the US knows this well.

Divide and conquer is the name of the game, if the complex foreign policy initiative outlined here is currently in action then it would aim to eventually bring about a situation where normalization deals again come to the table, Israel can attempt to recover and will no longer be faced with a situation where one single wrong move could spell their end.

None of this will end the Palestinian resistance, but it will change the unpredictable nature of the current regional conflict.

– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.