Our Monday News Analysis | What the World THINKS Now!

Grote Markt in Ieper, Belgium | Photo by Eduard Delputte on Unsplash

Living Words from John Paul II | ‘Peace Is More Than the Absence of War’

The Grote Markt, Ypres (Ieper), Belgium
17 May 1985

Pursuing peace requires clear insight into competing interests
and the principles and values at stake.

Peace is more than the absence of war;
it rests on freedom, human dignity, justice, solidarity, mercy, love of neighbor, truth, and hope.

This is the message of those who fell here: in this remarkable square,
even on the ruins of hatred, a house of peace and love can rise again!

Silence lets violence drown out calls for justice and peace,
while war threats and selfishness block dialogue and understanding.

Speaking out can curb the arms race’s drain on resources and redirect them
to food, health care, development, and housing, especially in the poorest countries.

Saint Pope John Paul II
Pastoral Visit to the Netherlands,
Solemn Celebration in Ypres
The Grote Markt, Ypres (Ieper), Belgium
17 May 1985

Read the Vatican text

Building the Bridge Foundation

FROM THE BRIDGE| The American Way ... Why Not?

By Abraham A. van Kempen
Founder and Chairman
9 November 2026

Last Friday, I wrote:

               Let’s turn confrontation into reconciliation.

               Rather than cheering opposing sides, we must seek a future beyond war.

               We’re stuck in the rut of mutual deterrence.

               While others backed sides in wars deadlocked by mutual deterrence, we proposed a ‘New Yalta Conference.’ Presidents Trump, Xi, and Putin must help heal our broken humanity, guided by: “Destroy your enemies by becoming friends.” If they do, each deserves a share of the 2027 Nobel Peace Prize. We nominated them for 2026 and will renominate them in 2027 if unsuccessful.

               Only the insane want mutual annihilation; no one wants a nuclear crater in their backyard.

               Western Europeans—especially in Germany, France, and Britain—should think twice before confronting Eastern Europe, West Asia, and East Asia. Without U.S. support, which Trump is likely to withdraw, Europe may again become a sorry sack of nothing.

               I remain optimistic about Europe’s future, but ashamed of its self-proclaimed ‘elites’—clowns and fools in Brussels, Strasbourg, London, and Washington. The people will eventually vote them out, as in Israel and the United States.

...

Take a peek at our new website. It’ll be ready to launch in mid-January 2027.

We’re still on our way to Yalta in peace, slowly but surely.

Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta brokering peace that turned out to be make-believe

What happened at Yalta?

Roosevelt took and occupied West Germany. Churchill took and ‘occupied’ the United States—figuratively. Stalin took and occupied Eastern Europe, including East Germany.

Even before World War II, the United States was Europe’s most powerful proxy. From Yalta to Trump, the issue is what leadership means, not merely who holds power. I expect him to challenge Europe’s Globalism—its neocolonialism—with the ‘American Way.’

Force cannot lead the ‘free world,’ a lesson Trump has learned. “Peace through Strength” contradicts ‘Peace Is More Than the Absence of War.’

As I see it, the irony is this: Trump’s American Way resembles Putin’s Russian Way and Xi’s Chinese Way.

What, then, makes the American Way distinct?

References:

The Putin Doctrine: ‘A Unified European Home,’ Speech, Berlin Bundestag, 25 September 2001
The Putin Doctrine: ‘Security for One is Security for All,’ Speech, Munich 10 February 2007
The Trump Doctrine: ‘Nation Builders Harm Societies,’ Speech, Riyadh 13 May 2025
The Xi Jinping Doctrine: ‘Global Governance As a Shared Project,’ Speech, SCO Tianjin, 1 September 2025

To be continued on Friday, 13 November 2026.

With every good wish to you, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Abraham A. van Kempen, Founder and Chairman
Building the Bridge Foundation, The Hague
Bridging Differences to Heal a Broken Humanity

Remember! Diplomacy is catalytic—transformative —while military action is cataclysmic—destructive and catastrophic.

When faced with the options to be good, bad, or ugly, let’s build bridges, not burn them. After all, mutual deterrence reigns.

FORMER HEAD OF THE GERMAN ARMY, GENERAL HARALD KUJAT, EXPOSES LIES ABOUT THE UKRAINE WAR

General Harald Kujat is a former head of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and the former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee.

Having held the top military position in both Germany and NATO, General Kujat offers his expertise on how the West and Russia ended up fighting a proxy war in Ukraine.

General Kujat discusses the failure to reach a common understanding after the Cold War, the toppling of President Yanukovych in Ukraine, the sabotage of the Minsk agreement and the Istanbul peace negotiations, and the West's lies about an "unprovoked" and "full-scale invasion" of Ukraine.

When Boris Johnson came to Ukraine to sabotage the peace negotiations in 2022, one of Zelensky's close associates summed up the essence of Johnson's visit: "Johnson brought two simple messages to Kyiv.

• The first is that Putin is a war criminal; he should be pressured, not negotiated with.
• And the second is that even if Ukraine is ready to sign some agreements on guarantees with Putin, they are not.
• We can sign [an agreement] with you [Ukraine], but not with him. Anyway, he will screw everyone over".

The essence of General Kujat's position is that the war could have been prevented and could have been ended shortly after it began or during its further development.

Watch the Video Here (44 minutes, 23 seconds)

Host: Prof. Glenn Diesen
Substack.com
25 September 2025

ESSAY | Ukraine, Diplomacy and Europe’s Strategic Crossroads – Harald Kujat’s critique of Western strategy and his case for a negotiated peace

By Glenn Diesen
8 November 2026

Harald Kujat, a retired German four-star general, former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, and former Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, argues that a series of false Western narratives has prolonged the war in Ukraine:

• that Russia’s invasion was unprovoked,
• that Moscow aimed to conquer all of Ukraine,
• that Ukraine could win militarily,
• that Russia was unwilling to negotiate, and
• that continued Western military aid would eventually shift the strategic balance.

These assumptions have:

• obstructed diplomatic solutions,
• contributed to Ukraine’s destruction, and
• brought Europe dangerously close to a direct confrontation with Russia.

This article summarizes the arguments General Kujat made in the video podcast above on September 25, 2025.

The Breakdown of NATO–Russia Relations

Relations between NATO and Russia improved considerably in the years immediately following the Cold War. Moscow pursued closer ties, while frameworks such as the NATO–Russia Founding Act and the NATO–Russia Council created regular channels for political and military dialogue.

Two developments fundamentally damaged this relationship.

1. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, weakening a key pillar of strategic nuclear stability. Russia saw the move as an American effort to gain strategic superiority.
2. The second turning point came at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, when Washington advocated for Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance.

Russia’s two main strategic objectives have consistently been to avoid military confrontation with the United States and NATO. Moscow therefore sought a security arrangement to keep conflicts along its borders from escalating into direct confrontation. As NATO expanded, this problem became increasingly centered on Ukraine.

The False Narrative of an Unprovoked War

1. Calling Russia’s February 2022 invasion unprovoked ignores the eight years that came before it.
2. The 2014 ouster of Ukraine’s democratically elected president, Viktor Yanukovych, was followed by civil war in eastern Ukraine and sharp restrictions on the civil rights of the region’s Russian-speaking population.
3. The 2015 Minsk II agreement sought to resolve the conflict by granting Donbas special constitutional status and protecting the Russian language and culture in Ukraine.
4. Ukraine never implemented these constitutional provisions. Instead, with Western assistance, it modernized, expanded, and rearmed its armed forces.
5. Later statements by Angela Merkel and François Hollande suggested that the Minsk process had merely bought Ukraine time to rearm, rather than resolve the conflict. This was a clear deception.
6. In December 2021, Russia proposed security agreements to the United States and NATO.
7. The proposals failed, and tensions escalated into war.

The False Claim That Russia Intended to Conquer Ukraine

Another common misconception is that Russia began a full-scale war with the aim of occupying all of Ukraine.

1. About 170,000 Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, facing a force of more than 400,000 troops that had been extensively equipped and trained by the West. The Russian force was too small to conquer and occupy the entire country.
2. The initial objective was more likely to topple the Ukrainian government and install pro-Russian leadership, possibly under Viktor Medvedchuk.
3. After this failed, Russia’s objectives shifted. Moscow then sought to control Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson within their former administrative boundaries, while also pursuing a broader security arrangement to prevent Ukraine from serving as a platform for NATO forces.

How the West Undermined the Istanbul Peace Negotiations

The Istanbul talks in spring 2022 offered a real chance to end the war.

By April 15, both sides had broadly agreed on Ukrainian neutrality and international security guarantees. The remaining questions were how those guarantees would work and what size and equipment Ukraine’s armed forces would be allowed.

These differences were intended to be resolved directly by Presidents Putin and Zelenskyy.

Western intervention derailed the agreement's conclusion. Boris Johnson’s April 9 visit to Kiev was especially consequential: the British prime minister urged Ukraine to keep fighting rather than pursue a settlement.

The U.S. defense secretary later stated the strategic goal: to weaken Russia politically, economically, and militarily.

Ukraine became the battleground for a proxy war between the United States and Russia, as European governments took on greater responsibility amid a shift in Washington’s position.

The False Promise of Ukrainian Military Victory

Western governments repeatedly claimed that Ukraine could defeat Russia and reclaim Crimea and the territories in eastern Ukraine. This was a strategic illusion from the very beginning.

1. Senior military leaders recognized the limits. American General Mark Milley said Ukraine had achieved all it could militarily and should negotiate. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhnyi also pointed to enormous equipment needs that Western countries could not meet.
2. Still, each new weapons system was touted as a potential game-changer. The political formula—that Ukraine must not lose and Russia must not win—replaced military strategy with wishful thinking.
3. The consequences were devastating. Repeated opportunities to stop the killing and destruction were missed, including Chinese and Brazilian peace initiatives and proposals from German political and security figures.
4. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán faced harsh criticism for trying to launch diplomatic efforts.
5. European governments, meanwhile, made no serious independent attempt to negotiate a settlement.

The False Claim That Russia Refuses Negotiations

Russia’s willingness to negotiate has also been misrepresented.

1. During the June 2025 talks in Istanbul, Moscow presented a memorandum outlining proposals for a ceasefire and peace settlement. Ukraine rejected negotiations on those terms, restricting discussions to prisoner exchanges and the return of abducted children.
2. Russia later insisted that a presidential meeting be preceded by substantive preliminary negotiations. Ukraine, meanwhile, demanded that the parties agree on security guarantees before such a meeting.
3. These opposing positions led to a diplomatic deadlock, but they did not show that Russia was unwilling to negotiate.

The Danger of Escalation and Europe’s Strategic Failure

Ukraine’s worsening military position has increased the risk of escalation. Attacks on Russia’s nuclear early-warning systems, strategic bomber fleet, and other sensitive targets could widen the war into a direct confrontation between nuclear powers.

European proposals to provide Taurus missiles, deploy NATO troops in Ukraine, or establish a no-fly zone could likewise turn indirect participation into direct military involvement.

The November 2022 missile incident in Poland highlighted the danger. Former Polish President Andrzej Duda later said Zelenskyy had pressured him to blame Russia for the Ukrainian missile.

European leaders must recognize that expanding the war could avert Ukraine’s isolated military defeat, but only at the risk of triggering a potentially catastrophic conflict in Europe.

Europe’s continued pursuit of military victory also reflects an unwillingness to confront its earlier strategic missteps. Instead of supporting American efforts to negotiate, European governments have obstructed them while weakening their own defense capabilities and economies.

Peace Requires a New European Security Order

Military and political victories are fundamentally different. Russia has also faced strategic setbacks, such as Finland and Sweden joining NATO and its declining influence in the South Caucasus.

Moscow therefore has reason to seek an end to the war, though its territorial aims and Ukraine’s neutrality remain major obstacles.

The goal is not simply to secure a ceasefire, but to create a lasting European security order that accounts for the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, prevents renewed conflict, and restores strategic stability among the nuclear powers.

Europe must give up the illusion that it can defeat Russia militarily, pursue serious negotiations, and rebuild ties with Washington. Only a negotiated settlement can prevent further destruction in Ukraine and help Europe regain geopolitical influence in an increasingly multipolar world.

STANISLAV KRAPIVNIK: UKRAINE'S LAST FORTIFIED LINE HAS BEEN BREACHED

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former U.S. Army officer from Donbas, moved from the United States to Russia 15 years ago.

• Prof. Glenn Diesen warns that escalating confrontation is narrowing diplomatic options and raises concerns about Ukraine’s defenses, infrastructure, and winter outlook.
• U.S. Captain Stanislav Krapivnik (retired) argues that Russian advances and pressure on supply routes are weakening Ukraine, while Western production and logistics cannot sustain a prolonged conflict.
• He predicts worsening disruption to essential services, food insecurity, displacement and political instability, including a possible confrontation in Poland.

Captain Stanislav Krapivnik’s argument is that a prolonged war depends on the ability to produce supplies and deliver them reliably—not simply on battlefield tactics.

His reasoning follows four steps:

• Armies depend on supply networks. Food, fuel, ammunition, and spare parts must reach troops. Disrupting depots, railways and bridges can weaken forces without directly defeating them in combat.
• Production must keep pace with consumption and losses. He claims Russia’s shell and tank output greatly exceeds NATO’s, implying that Russia could sustain fighting longer.
• Technology and training shape endurance. He argues that better tank protection means more drones are needed to destroy vehicles, while Western training remains poorly suited to attrition and drone warfare.
• Replacing capacity during war would be difficult. He suggests that European factories would be vulnerable to strikes and doubts that the United States would accept the casualties required for intervention.

Conclusion: these alleged industrial, logistical, and political limitations would make NATO unable to sustain—and ultimately win—a prolonged conventional war against Russia.

Watch the Video Here (45 minutes, 39 seconds)

Host: Prof. Glenn Diesen
Substack.com
07 November 2026

ESSAY | The War Beneath the Headlines -- A personal reflection on Stanislav Krapivnik’s presentation

By Abraham A. van Kempen
9 November 2026

When I listen to Stanislav Krapivnik, I picture a factory light burning through the night. He urges us to look beyond battlefield losses to future replacements and the supplies to sustain them. This essay asks whether commitments can survive the journey from political promise, through production, to the front. We can debate flags, leaders, and visions of Europe, but a soldier without ammunition cannot fire a declaration. What unsettles me isn’t Krapivnik’s certainty that Russia will prevail, but his warning: resolve without the means to sustain it may burn brightly and leave people in the dark.

Krapivnik argues that Russia is weakening Ukraine’s resistance by targeting its defenses, trained personnel, industry, and supply routes. His NATO argument challenges the alliance’s strategy and ability to sustain Ukraine; it does not show Russia has defeated NATO in direct combat. I’ll take his strongest points seriously without treating every prediction as fact.

Begin with his assessment of the Donbas front: he sees the reported loss of a rear logistics hub as more significant than another colored patch on a map. The November interview summary identifies Dobropillya and says Russian advances have compromised Ukraine’s logistical rear, increasingly isolating the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk–Druzhkivka cluster. These are his battlefield claims. November interview account. The argument is compelling: a fortress need not crumble stone by stone if its supply roads become unusable.

Picture the difference: a defensive line is a locked door; a threatened supply network is a house losing its plumbing, wiring, and foundations. Krapivnik argues that Russian forces have several possible routes forward, forcing Ukraine to choose where to deploy its limited defenders. The challenge is not just Russia’s advance, but protecting several possible futures at once. If his battlefield premises hold, pressure compounds: threatened roads need protection, redeployments expose other areas, and uncertainty ties up reserves.

His strongest argument is the factory floor: not a tank awaiting a charge, but a production line running past midnight. Reuters’ July 2024 investigation linked Ukraine’s shell shortage to years of Western strategic, funding, and production failures—ignored warnings, shutdowns, and aging facilities. Though it doesn’t establish today’s balance, it supports his warning: industrial weakness takes longer to fix than governments take to announce intentions.

Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimates Russia produced about seven million large-caliber rounds in 2025, including howitzer, mortar, and tank ammunition, and rockets. The assessment does not mean these rounds are interchangeable or prove Krapivnik’s claim that Russia produces in a month what NATO makes in six. It does support the narrower point that Russia has expanded its war-sustaining machinery.

Krapivnik claims Russia produces over 1,000 tanks annually and could match thirty years of NATO’s current output. But current production rates cannot be compared with historical totals. Germany and Spain produced 219 new Leopard 2E tanks from 2001 to 2008; a German-Greek program delivered 170 Leopard 2HEL tanks in 2006–2009. Leopard 2E production record; Leopard 2HEL program account. KNDS confirms Hungary completed delivery of 44 Leopard 2A7HU tanks in December 2025. KNDS delivery confirmation.

This research covers 1 December 1996–8 November 2026, not the rest of November or a complete alliance census. Britain delivered all 386 Challenger 2 tanks by April 2002; Italy’s 200 Ariete program ran from 1995 to August 2002 (Challenger 2 program record; Ariete production history). Because both began before the research period, their full totals cannot be included. Manufacturing, including exports, differs from NATO purchases; multinational assembly must not be double-counted, and orders are not completed production. These examples do not show whether the thirty-year total exceeded 1,000.

Russia’s figures also warrant scrutiny. In February 2024, Reuters cited IISS estimates that 1,000–1,500 tanks entered Russian service the previous year, but at most 200 were newly built; most were refurbished. This does not reflect current production. Replacement capacity matters, but neither a claim of 1,000 newly manufactured tanks annually nor Krapivnik’s NATO comparison is established here.

Replacing a tank is only part of Krapivnik’s story. He links factory and front, ensuring soldiers receive replacement vehicles, food, fuel, and ammunition.

_________________________________________________

A factory can replenish the fleet; it cannot, by itself, keep the fleet fighting.

_________________________________________________

From machinery, the discussion shifts to arteries: bridges, railways, fuel depots, and warehouses. Krapivnik argues that disrupting them can weaken an army without defeating every unit. A bridge need not collapse; damage that blocks heavy traffic is enough. Permanent bridges are faster than pontoons and barges, though his timings are illustrative, not measured. The result is friction: longer journeys, smaller deliveries, and yesterday’s manageable demands becoming tomorrow’s emergency.

This is where strategy reaches the kitchen. In his account, Kyiv’s generators cannot run indefinitely if diesel deliveries falter. At dusk, an apartment’s elevator is silent, the tap unreliable, and a parent checks whether a child’s room is warm. I cannot treat his prediction that parts of the capital will be abandoned as verified, but I understand the vulnerability: electricity, water, heating, and transport are intertwined, and weakness in one can harm the others.

Don’t mistake recognition for applause. Civilian suffering is no flourish on a strategist’s map. Krapivnik sees displacement as easing Russian advances by reducing evacuation demands. But it means people abandoning familiar streets with their lives in bags. His strongest case explains coercive pressure; it doesn’t endorse it. That suffering can shape war doesn’t make it acceptable or inevitable.

His criticism of Ukraine’s counteroffensive follows the same logic: ambition cannot replace the conditions for success. He argues that Russian attacks lacked air cover, artillery, engineers, and coordinated protection, while obstacles slow attackers and expose them to defenders. His enormous casualty estimates need corroboration. But his central challenge remains: when essential tools are absent, asking soldiers to compensate with courage risks treating courage as a resource others can spend.

And that brings us back to NATO. Krapivnik warns of a dangerous gap between political resolve and the resources for a prolonged war of attrition. He predicts broader military defeat and a European political crisis. Estonia’s assessment notes that Russia’s ammunition expansion also relies on imports and subsidized enterprises—not effortless self-sufficiency. Take his warning seriously by examining vulnerabilities, not adopting his certainty.

Estonian intelligence assessment.

The factory light burning through the night, in Krapivnik’s argument, exposes the gap between promises and the means to fulfill them—not a knowable future. Russia may turn industrial endurance and logistical pressure into lasting advantage. Heed the warning without treating the forecast as gospel. Supporting Ukraine means matching commitments with deliverable resources and facing realistic diplomatic choices. Hope should be a lamp, not a blindfold. Beyond the factory gate, people deserve honest decisions about what can be sustained and at what human cost.

Summary

• Endurance is key. Krapivnik argues that replacing losses and maintaining supplies matter more than declarations of resolve.
• Industrial evidence supports a narrower warning: Reuters documented Western ammunition-production weaknesses, while Estonia estimates significant Russian output. Neither verifies all of Krapivnik’s comparisons. (Reuters investigation; Estonian intelligence assessment.)
• Tank figures need context: new production differs from refurbishment, and current rates aren’t directly comparable to totals accumulated over 30 years. His dramatic comparison remains unverified, but warrants caution. See Reuters on tank replenishment.
• Logistics links factories to the battlefield. He argues replacement vehicles depend on continued fuel, food, and ammunition deliveries; his battlefield and infrastructure predictions remain assertions, which suggest possible outcomes.
• Advantage alone doesn’t determine the outcome. The essay takes his warning about endurance seriously without assuming NATO’S/Ukraine’s defeat.

Will the EU-US/NATO axis ever wake up? It’s like rubbing a blemished pearl until nothing remains—not even the pearl. Those who think either Russia or NATO will prevail have another thing coming. Either side could defeat the other: in Europe in under 10 minutes and in North America in under 35 minutes. But afterward, nothing would be left on either side except nuclear craters.

The warring parties are locked in a cycle of mutual deterrence. Will this become a ‘forever war?’ If former U.S. Captain Stanislav Krapivnik’s assumptions are close to reality, there won’t be a Ukraine soon. The West treats Ukraine as its blemished pearl. It is among the most corrupt and poorest in Europe. Trying to rub away Ukraine’s blemishes will only speed its extinction. There won’t be a Ukraine left.

What happens next? Where will the winds of war carry us?

LAWRENCE WILKERSON: AMERICA'S RETREAT FROM EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST

Lawrence Wilkerson is a retired U.S. Army colonel who served as chief of staff to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Watch the Video Here (57 minutes, 49 seconds)

Host: Prof. Glenn Diesen
Substack.com
30 October 2026

Wilkerson’s Perspective on U.S. Retreat

For Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, a U.S. retreat from Europe and the Middle East would redistribute power, not end global primacy. Failures there are driving Washington toward a focused Pacific confrontation with China. The contradiction: America may relinquish regional dominance while retaining the hegemonic ambition that made its commitments unsustainable.

Wilkerson sees the war in Ukraine as undermining Europe’s strategy of using Russia to counter China indirectly. Increased defense spending could build an independent security architecture tailored to Europe. He considers NATO obsolete and believes new political leadership could enable Europeans to take greater responsibility while retaining possible U.S. nuclear protection.

He portrays U.S. involvement in the Middle East as increasingly costly and counterproductive. Regional opposition, Iran’s ties to China and Russia, and Gulf instability limit U.S. dominance. Israel remains the main complication, tying U.S. policy to conflicts that impede withdrawal.

The distinction is between strategic retreat and voluntary restraint. Retreat shifts resources when commitments become unsustainable; restraint accepts limits on power and adjusts policy. Wilkerson sees the Pacific redeployment as potentially a retreat, though he advocates restraint: readiness without provocation, diplomatic accommodation, and cooperation on climate change and nuclear dangers. Leaving two theaters would not necessarily mean Washington had abandoned its pursuit of dominance.

Europe and the Middle East: Reasons for Retreat

The comparison summarizes Wilkerson’s interview arguments, not verified outcomes.

Wilkerson argues that European failure and Middle East resistance are narrowing Washington’s options and accelerating its pivot to China. Europe must take greater responsibility for its security, while Israel complicates acceptance of a regional security order. Merely shifting U.S. forces won’t solve the problem; without diplomatic accommodation, confrontation may shift to the Pacific.

Strategic Retreat versus Voluntary Restraint

Strategic retreat concerns where Washington directs its power. Wilkerson argues that failure in Europe and unsustainable Middle East involvement could shift forces toward China without abandoning dominance, potentially heightening confrontation there.

Voluntary restraint means recognizing other centers of influence, addressing their interests diplomatically, and staying militarily prepared without provoking conflict. This reflects Wilkerson’s preference for cooperation on climate change and nuclear danger over restoring American hegemony.

Retreat reduces or shifts commitments; restraint changes objectives. Wilkerson’s forecast of a Pacific shift isn’t a recommendation for less confrontational foreign policy.

References:

The Putin Doctrine: ‘A Unified European Home,’ Speech, Berlin Bundestag, 25 September 2001
The Putin Doctrine: ‘Security for One is Security for All,’ Speech, Munich, 10 February 2007
The Trump Doctrine: ‘Nation Builders Harm Societies,’ Speech, Riyadh,/ 13 May 2025
The Xi Jinping Doctrine: ‘Global Governance As a Shared Project,’ Speech, SCO Tianjin, 1 September 2025

BUILDING THE BRIDGE! | A WAY TO GET TO KNOW THE OTHER AND ONE ANOTHER

Making a Difference – The Means, Methods, and Mechanisms for Many to Move Mountains

Photo Credit: Abraham A. van Kempen, our home away from home on the Dead Sea

By Abraham A. van Kempen
Senior Editor
Updated 19 January 2024

Those who commit to 'healing our broken humanity' build intercultural bridges to learn to know and understand one another and others. Readers who thumb through the Building the Bridge (BTB) pages are not mindless sheep following other mindless sheep. They THINK. They want to be at the forefront of making a difference. They're seeking the bigger picture to expand their horizons. They don't need BTB or anyone else to confirm their biases.

Making a Difference – The Means, Methods, and Mechanisms for Many to Move Mountains

Accurate knowledge fosters understanding, dispels prejudice, and sparks a desire to learn more about the subject. Words have an extraordinary power to bring people together, divide them, forge bonds of friendship, or provoke hostility. Modern technology offers unprecedented possibilities for good, fostering harmony and reconciliation. Yet, its misuse can cause untold harm, leading to misunderstandings, prejudices, and conflicts.

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