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Bashar al-Assad and his wife Asma with their daughter Zein and sons Hafez, second right, and Karim in 2022

The Assads' next chapter: A 'desert rose' wife, three preppy children and a life of luxury | The Independent

SEYMOUR HERSH | THE FALL OF BASHAR ASSAD

My encounters with the Syrian dictator

This week, a torn portrait of Bashar Assad is seen inside the Presidential Palace in Damascus. Photo by Ali Haj Suleiman/Getty Images.

By Seymour Hersh
Substack.com
10 December 2024

My father’s generation was fixated on December 7, 1941, the “day of infamy” when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and triggered America’s entry into World War II. My day came on March 20, 2003, when the administration of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney responded to Osama bin Laden’s attack on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, by bombing Baghdad, the capital of Iraq.

The strange decision to respond to an Islamist terrorist attack on the United States by bombing the capital of a nation whose leader, Saddam Hussein, was known for his hostility to Islamist terrorism was rarely remarked upon as the US went to war. America invaded Iraq along with many embedded journalists, who were individually handpicked by the military and allowed to ride along and report on American glory as US forces sped toward Baghdad from Kuwait, America’s genuine ally in the Persian Gulf.

And so, on the night of June 18, with Saddam Hussein in hiding and the war in what was thought of as a mop-up phase, there was an American special forces shoot-up on the Syrian side of the Iraqi border. As many as eighty Syrians involved in smuggling gasoline—not covert arms or nuclear bombs—were slain. The Syrian government made no complaint about the incident, which had been covered up when I chanced on the story in Washington while working for the New Yorker.

I had been told earlier by persons in the US intelligence community that Syria, then led by Bashar Assad—the son of Hafez Assad, who had collaborated with Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration—had become one of America’s best intelligence sources in the fight against Al Qaeda. Ironically, Syria had been on the State Department terrorism list since 1979 and was considered by the Bush administration to be a sponsor of state terrorism. At one point, the nation was publicly named by the White House to be a junior member of its infamous “Axis of Evil” while it was providing much-valued intelligence to the CIA.

So I had to get there.

I had a contact in Beirut who initially arranged a meeting with me with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, who Israel assassinated in his Beirut hideaway on September 27. It was a short car ride across the Syrian border to Damascus from Nasrallah's offices. Nasrallah told me then—we were speaking on the record—that although he hated Israel for its treatment of the Arab community in Israel and elsewhere, he would support any peace agreement that was agreed to by the Arab world.

Damascus, considered the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, is steeped in charm, beauty, and history. One could not imagine what was to come. An interview with Assad was arranged for me. However, the day before that meeting, I was invited to meet with Khaled Mashal, the head of Hamas’s office in Damascus. Hamas had just been kicked out of Jordan, and Assad had given it a temporary home. I knew little about Hamas but learned a great deal over a long morning and lunch with Mashal, who told me he had been a high school physics teacher in Kuwait before being fired for his radical political activities, such as advocating the violent end of Israel. The last I heard of him came this past summer when he was named the de facto head of what is left of Hamas—Israeli assassinations had thinned the Hamas leadership—and he was no longer in Doha. He did not tell me then in Damascus that he had survived a botched Israeli attempt to assassinate him with opiates in 1997 in Amman. The assassination was authorized by then-first-term Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was forced to apologize publicly to the incensed Jordanian government and agree to a prisoner release in amends.

And so I met with Assad in his unpretentious office in downtown Damascus. I was full of CIA leaks about the reliable information Assad had provided the agency, including hundreds of files on the membership and operations of Al Qaeda. It was invaluable information. I also knew the Syrian intelligence service had hundreds of files on the men who participated in the 9/11 attacks and, so I had been told in Washington, many files on those who wanted to participate.

Assad’s intelligence service also had tipped off the US to an impending Al Qaeda bombing attack on the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. Assad did not want to discuss that because I thought it was newly acquired intelligence.

It was hard not to be impressed, especially when I was told that Assad, under pressure from the CIA, had given the US the name of his government’s most vital agent inside Al Qaeda. The name came with a condition: the CIA would not directly approach recruiting the agent. Of course, the agency did, presumably with wads of cash. The Syrian source rebuffed the US recruiting attempt and angrily broke off contact with the Syrian intelligence services—net gain minus one fantastic source.

The Syrian president insisted that I not publish a word of this—about his and America’s indiscretions—and I did not. But I was surprised by his willingness to help America beat Al Qaeda. I would learn that Israel, once informed of the information provided by Assad, remained skeptical. If Assad knew as much as he claimed about Al Qaeda, a senior Israeli diplomat told me, he indeed had to know in advance of the 9/11 attacks and gave no warning. The diplomat was deadly serious.

I have another stunning memory of one of my post-9/11 visits to Damascus. In 1983, I published a book on Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy and, like Kissinger, became fascinated with the brilliance of one of the revered Syrian military generals of the time. He was retired and living modestly with his wife when I called on him and invited me for dinner. I went happily and noticed two new Mercedes sedans in his driveway.

Dinner was off the record. He was fluent in English, as I had been told, and afterward, with his wife off to bed and the house quiet, the general—we had had a few drinks of arak by then—told me he had something special he wanted to show me. Down to his basement, we went, and dozens of photographs greeted me, many of them pornographic, of one of Europe’s most famous and most beautiful movie stars. There was even a naked statue of her.

This was the general’s prize possession, not the medals and pendants hanging on a wall upstairs. It was a revelation for a Chicago kid who covered the police in the early 1960s and thought he had seen it all.

I had a few more meetings with Assad as the Iraq War wore down and America was consumed with the hunt for weapons of mass destruction that some in Washington were convinced that Saddam Hussein had hidden somewhere in Iraq. The meetings came because I had continued to visit Nasrallah in Beirut, and invitations from Damascus were extended.

I learned then of the intense hatred and contempt many Syrians hold for Assad. My concerns were always about international events, not domestic conditions, though I was aware of rural hardships outside Damascus. I had been invited to a concert by an international string quartet in the courtyard of an elegant home in the historic old quarter of Damascus.

A hundred chairs were set in the yard, with two empty seats in the front row for the president and his wife. When they arrived at the last moment, a groan of disappointment and disapproval rolled through the crowd. It was hard to ignore. I asked a friend who had invited me what was up. He told me of the enormous contempt for the president for his unwillingness to stop the rampant corruption of his family and the jailing and brutal mistreatment of dissidents.

I had asked the president many times about his family’s corruption, and he complained, again and again, that he was unable to stop his uncles and cousins in their insatiable need for money. As for the jailing of dissidents, he explained that he was constantly intervening with the internal security authorities to minimize the length of sentences and mistreatment in prisons. I made a point in my articles for the New Yorker to quote the various human rights organizations that were increasingly critical of Assad. But it would become apparent in the next few years that it was insufficient.

At the time, I was dealing with many outside complaints about Syria, such as Israel’s still unproven claims that Assad was involved in a secret project to build a nuclear bomb and was enriching uranium in an above-ground reactor a few hundred miles northeast of Damascus, along the Euphrates River. In 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the building in a widely reported bombing raid. I noted that the facility was not a reactor but had been involved in upgrading the Syrian missile arsenal. Many insist otherwise, but in the seventeen years since, there has been exhaustive and accurate reporting on the Syrian chemical and biological arsenal that was destroyed under United Nations watch, but not a word about a Syrian nuclear weapons program. Many still believe that the facility was enriching uranium with the help of workers from North Korea.

It was impossible to imagine what was to come: a civil war beginning in 2012, which Assad survived only because of the intervention of Russia and its air force in 2015. Six million Syrians have fled the country, creating a refugee crisis across much of Europe while strengthening the role of the Alawites, the religious minority to which Assad belongs. There were more prisons and more torture of the growing political opposition. I was invited to meet with Assad on my last visit to Damascus in late 2011 when there were strong rumors of a possible settlement with Israel, orchestrated by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey.

In the end, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has another war on his hands, allowed Assad to send his wife and children to Moscow in late November. The humbled and despised Syrian President followed them ten days later, just as ancient Damascus, disfigured by years of civil war, fell quietly to an uncertain future.

What is the Side of the Story that is Not Yet Decisive? Edited by Abraham A. van Kempen

THE FALL OF ASSAD AND THE ‘AXIS OF RESISTANCE’?

The October 7 Hamas attack unraveled truths across the region, reopening questions of the future that lay dormant for years. Now, with the fall of Assad, the power map is being redrawn, presenting new threats and possibilities.

A Syrian Rebel Fighter Stands On A Picture Of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad In The Old Town Of Aleppo, on September 7, 2012. (Photo: Ahmed Deeb / Apa Images)

By Abdaljawad Omar
Mondoweiss.net
December 10, 2024

In its relentless violence, war occupies a paradoxical space—a force that can simultaneously overthrow and unmake open possibilities while foreclosing them in tragic finality. The events in Syria in the past two weeks stand as a profound example of this paradox, a testament not only to the possibilities unleashed by the eruption of war, beginning with Tufan al-Aqsa1 and its repercussions across the region and the world but also to war’s transformative power to awaken what was dormant and animate what was frozen.

The events in Syria, while awaiting more historically detailed analysis in the future, already align with the broader patterns of strain and vulnerability that the ‘Axis of Resistance’ has accumulated throughout its year-long confrontation with Israel and decades or so confrontation with various geopolitical forces. However, the stark truth is that Assad’s regime effectively collapsed within twelve days—and it did so without putting up a meaningful fight.

One can already anticipate the theses that will emerge in future analyses. Structural arguments will likely focus on how Hezbollah’s and Iran’s deep entanglement in the Syrian conflict weakened the broader axis, stretching its resources and diminishing its political capital. They will simultaneously reveal how success in expansion and maintaining alliances planted the seeds for future failure. Others will underscore the moral and narrative cost of supporting an undeniably brutal regime, a decision that eroded the Axis’s legitimacy in the eyes of many.

Additional arguments will inevitably flow. Chief among them will be the contention that occupying the mantle of resistance, particularly by regimes like Assad’s, requires more than logistical support for resistance movements. It demands confrontation with Israel—an element conspicuously absent for the past fifty years. Some analyses will likely delve into the role of sectarianism, disentangling its implications for the Axis’s fragmentation and cohesion. Others will interrogate authoritarianism’s entrenchment within the resistance framework, while yet another line of thought will address the impact of imperial interventions and their reconfiguration of power within the region.

Some analyses will pivot away from focusing solely on the Axis of Resistance or imperial intervention and instead examine the nature, character, and evolution of the actors on the ground. These arguments will likely underscore the lack of cohesion among the forces that fought against Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the years when Assad managed to fend off opposition and maintain control over Syria after 2011. However, this fragmentation and inability to unify, hegemonize, or effectively organize began to shift in Idlib, where specific factions rose to prominence in the anti-Assad struggle. Backed by Turkey and strategically employed to counterbalance Kurdish ambitions, these factions marked a turning point in the conflict.

In Idlib, this fractured reality began to stabilize gradually. The establishment of a Keyan or “state,” centered around Sunni Muslims and operating in a more structured manner, laid the foundation for a ground offensive that exposed the Assad regime’s inherent weaknesses. This shift represented a significant moment in the broader struggle, showcasing how localized organization and external support could erode the regime’s capacity to maintain dominance. Whatever the eventual analyses or interpretations—whether they trace the legacies of colonialism in shaping the modern Syrian state or investigate the regime’s brutal crackdowns, prisons, and apparatuses of control—the stark reality remains: the Syrian army did not put up a fight. In the face of mounting pressure, Assad and his family, like many leaders before him, fled to Russia, leaving behind a shattered state and a battlefield for competing powers.

Truth and Tufan al-Aqsa

Many commentators have recently blamed Tufan al-Aqsa for the region's broader decline of the Axis of Resistance. Yet, beneath this surface reading lies a more disquieting terrain, riddled with questions that resist immediate resolution. These are questions of truth—not the kind enshrined in political or military classifications but the kind that lurks beneath, destabilizing the masks, rupturing alignments, and unsettling the supposed coherence of this historical moment. In many ways, if there is something the Tufan offers beyond its promise of liberation, it is the ability to unravel truths.

In the flood’s violent turbulence, specific questions emerge, weighted with the gravity of what they reveal: Who stands beside Palestine and its horizon, truly? Who negotiates for survival, their loyalty dissolved in the crucible of fear? Who collapses because their system, propped up by flimsy artifices, was always destined to fail? Who dares to venture into the abyss of commitment and shrinks back, their resolve brittle? Who abstains entirely, their inaction complicit? And whose monstrous cruelty is laid bare, their narratives crumbling under the harsh glare of scrutiny, the blindness of others no longer an adequate shield?

Israel, for decades cloaked in the garments of democratic sanctity, now stands exposed—a state of relentless brutality fashioned from colonial violence and sustained by genocide. A state whose existence depends entirely on the scaffolding of Europe and the United States, choking the Arab world, extinguishing its futures before it can articulate itself.

Its narrative of legitimacy unravels under the weight of its violence, and its claim to moral high ground is eroded. Meanwhile, Assad’s Syria stumbles forward, paralyzed and drained of vitality by the redundancy of its rhetoric and the inertia of its governance. Iran, ever pragmatic, weaves through the chaos, supporting and maneuvering yet hesitating to commit fully. It clings to its project with calculated caution, refusing to disrupt the status quo radically—a delicate dance that avoids the precipice but risks irrelevance.

The Arab state system, locked in its obsessive self-preservation and desperate to maintain Western favor, suffocates the cry of Palestine within its people’s hearts. These regimes, indifferent to the charred bodies before them, circulate images of horror, not to galvanize but to pacify—to teach the dreamers among them the cost of rebellion, the brutal certainty of their suppression.

And what of the Palestinians? Amid genocide and relentless confrontation, divisions persist. Arrows are aimed inward toward the “internal enemy” as the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank falters, incapable of defending itself or its people. These truths and many more, sharp and unrelenting, collapse into each other, their weight dismantling the old world and shaping the contours of a new one. Tufan al-Aqsa is not merely an event; it is a moment of unraveling, where the grand narratives are torn asunder, and the boundaries of power and legitimacy are violently redrawn. It is a scene drenched in the blood of innocents, its final lines etched in a language of devastation and rupture, demanding that we confront what lies beyond comprehension.

In Syria, the Assad regime, which chose to sit idle and refrain from confronting Israel when Gaza called on the world to act in solidarity, justified its inaction by claiming the need to safeguard its forces to contain the rebels. Ironically, the same regime that prioritized self-preservation over broader resistance was ultimately unable to include those very rebels, revealing its strategic miscalculations and the fragility of its position. The opportunity was there to renew some legitimacy, back the battered Hezbollah, and forge a new path of unity out of a decade of disunity, but the regime chose to sit idle. This is the truth, and with the weakness of its allies, both Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Iran, the Assad regime fell rapidly, cracking under the first signs of pressure.

What about Gaza?

The impact on the Palestinian cause and its resonance across the Arab world and the broader field of geopolitical competition demands a more protracted and reflective assessment. Central to this evaluation is the role of post-Assad Syria: the modes of governance it adopts, the boundaries it draws—both politically and spatially— the trajectory it envisions for itself, and more importantly, the ways it will define enemy from friend, or fail to reach any consensus recoiling to sectarianism and divisions that will eat up Syria into an endless war. The terrain does not look promising; the rebels are divided among themselves, and Syria, already weakened and divided, will be tested in the coming months and years, both internally and externally.

Already, Israel is showcasing a strategy it has long sought to exhibit: systematically dismantling Syria’s military capabilities through relentless bombings, targeting its arsenal to preempt any potential threat in the medium-term future. Simultaneously, it is expanding its hold on territories surrounding the Golan Heights, steadily encroaching and annexing new lands in a calculated effort to consolidate control, and using this moment to gain possible land and leverage, but hopeful it will be able to establish a new security line and perhaps build its local militias. This dual approach—eroding Syria’s defensive and offensive potential while advancing territorial ambitions—illustrates Israel’s intent not only to neutralize immediate risks but also to reshape the geopolitical landscape to its advantage. However, a weak Syria—regardless of who governs or presides over it—has always been favorable to Israel.

Israel will now fight tooth and nail to shape Syria into a wasteland, keeping it underdeveloped and incapable of retaining any semblance of sovereignty. This strategy ensures that Syria remains fragmented and powerless, unable to pose any meaningful challenge to Israel’s regional ambitions or its broader geopolitical agenda.

While Western countries scramble to understand the emergence of new forces in Syria—some of which they have backed—they also seek to capitalize on the opportunities this moment provides to shape the trajectory of a post-Assad Syria. At the same time, they remain deeply wary of the potential for Syria to evolve into an antagonistic force that could threaten their regional and global interests. This apprehension is not unfounded; it is grounded in historical precedents, particularly the case of the “mujahideen,” who were initially supported by Western powers but later turned against imperial interests. Such experiences underscore the unpredictable nature of alliances forged in times of conflict, further heightening the stakes of Western involvement in the evolving Syrian paradigm.

This also applies to the Axis itself, which is already signaling a willingness to negotiate, engage, and build relations with the new rulers of Damascus. The hope is that an anti-Western hegemonic stance might align these emerging forces with Hezbollah and Iran rather than against them, despite the years of war and blood between the rebels and these forces. However, such hopes remain speculative at best, as the immediate priority for the rulers of Syria is to maintain internal order and prevent the possibility of further fractures. Meanwhile, countries with significant leverage over the new forces actively shape the emerging paradigm, with Turkey playing a particularly prominent role. As the dominant external actor in the region, Turkey’s influence will be crucial in determining the trajectory of Syria’s political realignment and its broader role within the evolving regional order. The signals of what lies ahead, its uncertainty, the danger of more chaos rather than order, and the fear that Syria will be broken further into bits and pieces are all part of the panoramic picture of the current moment.

However, the fact remains that the direct impact on Gaza appears minimal. The forces that previously provided critical support to Gaza have already withdrawn from the confrontation, choosing instead to settle for a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon and to de-escalate in the region. In doing so, they have effectively decoupled Gaza from Lebanon, severing a critical linkage that once bolstered the broader resistance axis. As a result, the immediate consequences of this decoupling on the current war are likely to remain limited. This is particularly true given that the most significant bargaining chip of the Palestinian resistance has already exited the war-battered, weakened, and now forced to navigate an increasingly hostile environment in Syria.

As events continue to unfold and radical shifts occur, some structures and systems will inevitably collapse, while others will rise from the wreckage. Israel, however, appears poised to navigate these shifts with calculated pragmatism, much as it did in the past when it strategically encouraged divisions among Palestinians—viewing the rise of Islamist factions as a counterforce to the then-dominant secular nationalist movements. Such tactical maneuvers have historically allowed Israel to exploit fractures within its adversaries, further consolidating its position. It hopes for a weak Syria, either fractured and unable to confront Israel or stable but willing to negotiate Syria’s surrender agreement.

For now, it is satisfied that Iran has lost a critical node, Hezbollah is further weakened, and its position in Lebanon remains further eroded.

What lies ahead

The fall of the Syrian regime offers a poignant reflection on the fragility of alliances, the calculus of survival, and the price of inertia. As Israel capitalizes on the fractures within its adversaries, carving new lines of dominance, it must reckon with the lessons of history—how division strategies can lay the groundwork for unanticipated resistance.

The collapse of Assad’s regime and the attenuation of the Axis signals the end of one era and the genesis of a turbulent and uncertain future. What emerges is not a clean slate but a mosaic of competing ambitions, ideological divides, and imperial interventions, each vying to shape Syria’s fate.

Amid this chaos, Palestine remains a litmus test, exposing the moral and strategic contradictions of regional and global powers, where words fail to align with action. Yet, the Tufan al-Aqsa has unraveled truths and reopened the question of futures—who will author them, under what terms, and at what cost.

As with all moments of rupture, commentary must resist the pull of closure. Instead, we must confront the abyss of contingency that lies ahead. Like many lands before it, will Syria become a battleground of endless fragmentations? Or will it, against all odds, forge a path toward coherence and sovereignty, reshaping the region and the global order in ways we have yet to imagine?

The answers remain elusive, but the stakes are clear: the map of power is being redrawn, and in the margins of its upheaval, new possibilities flicker—uncertain, contested, and fiercely alive.

Notes
Tufan al-Aqsa is the romanization of “عملية طوفان الأقصى,” which translates as “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,” the name of the Hamas-led operation on October 7, 2023. ↩︎

Abdaljawad Omar is a Palestinian scholar and theorist whose work focuses on the politics of resistance, decolonization, and the Palestinian struggle.

WHY DID SYRIA FALL SO FAST, AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT?

The unfolding events show the West’s willingness to use any means to achieve its strategic objectives and retain global supremacy.

People react to the fall of the Syrian regime in Umayyad Square on December 8, 2024, in Damascus, Syria. © Ali Haj Suleiman / Getty Images

By Murad Sadygzade, President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).

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HomeWorld News
8 December 2024

With each passing day since October 7, 2023, the contours of the regional processes unfolding in the Middle East have become increasingly apparent. That day—a watershed moment for the entire region—left behind many unanswered questions.

One of the most formidable intelligence agencies in the world, Israel’s Mossad, failed to foresee or prevent the attack by Palestinian groups, sparking widespread astonishment.

However, deeper processes lie beneath this shocking event, steadily propelling the region toward profound transformations. Mechanisms that once seemed hidden are becoming more apparent, revealing a deliberate design to reshape those nations that long resisted Western influence and expansion.

On the morning of December 8, the region was shaken by news that, until recently, seemed unimaginable: Damascus had fallen to the forces of opposition and terrorist groups. The Ba’ath Party’s rule under President Bashar Assad has been effectively destroyed. Assad’s disappearance and the silence from official sources only amplified the sense of irreversible change.

Following a prolonged war with Hamas and the near-total defeat of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, international and regional actors shifted their focus to Syria, a key player in the ‘Axis of Resistance’ against Israel. Syria, which had long served as a cornerstone of Iranian policy in the region, became the latest link in a chain of nations succumbing to mounting internal and external pressures.

These events are part of a broader scenario aimed at fundamentally altering the political and social landscape of the Middle East. With the weakening of key participants in the Axis of Resistance – from Palestinian groups to Syria and Lebanon – a crucial question arises: Who will be the next target of this rapidly unfolding plan? The region's fate and answers to pressing questions about the role of external forces in these developments remain uncertain. But one thing is clear: The Middle East will never be the same again.

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Assad in Moscow after Damascus falls: As it happened

What happened in Syria and why?

The escalation in Idlib province that began 11 days ago has rapidly spiraled into a series of events that have dramatically transformed Syria’s situation. On December 7, armed opposition forces and fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, designated a terrorist organization and banned in Russia) encircled Damascus, the nation’s capital.

Within a single night, they seized the strategic city of Homs, encountering little resistance, and advanced into Damascus itself. Along their path, they freed prisoners from numerous detention facilities, including Syria’s largest prison, Saydnaya, symbolizing the regime’s total loss of control.

By midday on December 7, panic had engulfed the city. Syrian soldiers, shedding their uniforms for civilian attire, fled the capital in haste, leaving it nearly defenseless. By nightfall, the streets of Damascus were deserted of military personnel, replaced by frightened citizens scrambling to stockpile food and flee their homes. This departure was particularly evident in the affluent northern districts, where residents departed en masse, fearing chaos. In contrast, the southern part of the city presented a starkly different scene: The opposition was welcomed as liberators there. Crowds gathered in celebration, waving flags, and in a climactic act of defiance, the statue of Hafez Assad, founder of the modern Syrian regime and father of Bashar Assad, was torn down.

Amid these dramatic events, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali made an urgent announcement. In a statement relayed by Al Arabiya, he declared the government’s capitulation and expressed his readiness to cooperate with the country’s new leadership.

Al-Jalali stressed that most ministers had remained in Damascus to ensure the continued functioning of state institutions and prevent chaos during the transitional period. He also revealed that an agreement had been reached with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani, marking a significant step in minimizing destruction in the capital.

The words of Hadi al-Bahra, head of the Syrian National Coalition, carried a tone of hope for a new chapter in the country’s history. He stated, “The situation is safe. The dark times in Syria have ended, and there is no place for vengeance in the new Syria.”

This declaration sought to reassure the population and highlight the opposition’s intent to avoid reprisals. Yet, behind the facade of such statements lies an undeniable anxiety about Syria’s future – its political fate and stability amid a period of profound transformation. A new day has dawned for the country, but whether it will bring peace remains unanswered.

The events unfolding in Syria are far from coincidental; they result from deep-seated processes that have been building for years. This tragedy was likely predestined by a confluence of internal contradictions, external pressures, and historical missteps, collectively creating a perfect storm capable of toppling even the most entrenched regimes. The Syrian crisis, which began as a standoff between the government and certain opposition groups, evolved into a prolonged conflict fueled by a complex mosaic of local, regional, and international interests.

Years of relentless warfare and an unwillingness to seek compromise led to worsening economic inequality, a brain drain of skilled workers, the collapse of state institutions and infrastructure, and the fragmentation and corruption of the political elite. Society, worn down by a lack of prospects, became deeply fractured, and the growing discontent among the population only hastened the weakening of the central government.

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Looters ransack the Iranian Embassy in Damascus (VIDEO)

However, it was not solely internal factors that brought about this outcome. Syria became a battleground for geopolitical rivalries, where external powers exploited the crisis to advance their agendas. From Western and Arab states backing the opposition to the direct involvement of foreign actors on Syrian soil, every side pursued its own goals, further deepening the conflict. Regional players like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Israel saw Syria’s weakening as an opportunity to bolster their influence. Yet, for years, these plans failed to materialize due to the robust support Syria received from Russia and Iran. The intervention of militants and terrorist groups added to the chaos, turning the struggle for power into a lawless war.

A key turning point came when Assad lost the support of even those who had stood by him for years. Economic hardships, sanctions, and a growing sense of hopelessness led many to believe that change was inevitable, even if it came at the cost of destruction. The strategic mistake of the ruling elite – betting on a military solution to the conflict while ignoring political dialogue, both domestically and internationally – ultimately left Assad vulnerable to determined and well-organized adversaries.

Another significant factor was Assad’s persona. Born in 1965 into the family of Hafez Assad, Syria’s long-time leader, Bashar had no initial ambitions for a political career, choosing instead to pursue medicine. Educated as an ophthalmologist in Damascus and later specializing in London, he was seen as a secular and educated figure, far removed from the cruder aspects of Middle Eastern politics. However, a family tragedy – the death of his elder brother Basil – altered his destiny, forcing him to return to Syria and assume the role of his father’s successor. In 2000, following Hafez Assad’s death, Bashar ascended to the presidency, inheriting a nation with great potential but riddled with deep internal contradictions.

Over the years, Bashar Assad was at the center of mounting challenges. Corruption within his inner circle, international pressure, and a protracted war drained both the country and Assad personally. Another blow came with his wife Asma’s battle with cancer, which she has fought for years. These circumstances likely influenced his willingness to consider change. Media outlets frequently reported that Assad was ready to hand over power to the opposition, although no solid evidence supported this claim. Perhaps war fatigue, personal tragedies, and the realization of inevitable transformation made him more open to compromise. The Russian Foreign Ministry recently confirmed that following negotiations with various armed factions within Syria, Assad decided to step down from the presidency, leave the country, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power.

The recent capture of Homs and the fall of Damascus marked the final act in this tragedy. Syria found itself trapped by its missteps and the ambitions of external actors, with its people becoming pawns in a game where the stakes were not peace but power and resources. This crisis is not just about Syria’s fate – it is a stark reminder of the fragility of any state that ignores the signals of its society and allows external forces to dictate its future.

Who benefits, and what’s next?

The fall of Damascus was a turning point in Middle Eastern politics, signaling not only the collapse of Assad’s rule but also a significant weakening of Iran, which had spent years building its influence through its alliance with Syria. Tehran had regarded Syria as a vital link in the Axis of Resistance, encompassing Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestinian groups. Syria served as a crucial logistical hub for arming Hezbollah and providing both political and economic support. However, the collapse of the Syrian capital and the ensuing chaos shattered these supply chains. Capitalizing on the situation, Israel deployed forces into the buffer zone on the Golan Heights, effectively expanding its occupied territory. This move not only bolstered Israel’s strategic position but also deprived Iran of the ability to counteract its actions effectively in the region.

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Israel deploys troops to buffer zone with Syria.

The losses suffered by Hezbollah have dealt yet another blow to Iran. The Lebanese organization, long regarded as one of Tehran’s key instruments in its struggle against Israel, now finds itself isolated and weakened. The loss of arms supply routes and the destruction of its logistical chains have cast doubt on its combat readiness. The organization is now forced to reconsider its strategies, and its capacity to conduct effective military operations has been significantly curtailed. For Iran, this not only means a loss of influence in Lebanon but also the erosion of a central pillar of its broader Middle Eastern strategy. In this context, Tehran faces the daunting challenge of overhauling its foreign policy, causing a deep internal crisis.

Iranian media and officials have sought scapegoats for the unfolding catastrophe, and Assad has become the primary target of criticism. In its publications, Pars Today unequivocally places the blame on Assad, stating: “Bashar refused to stand to the end, and no one could change the outcome. Even Iran’s direct appeals did not affect him because he understood that the army and society (for reasons ranging from betrayal to lack of motivation or corruption) would not support him. It was clear five days ago that resistance would not occur; only the speed of events was surprising. Bashar is not an ideologically driven leader like Yahya Sinwar, who can hold out to the bitter end. For him, it was safe enough to leave Damascus. However, he will likely remember that Tehran was his only true ally over the last 13 years.” These words reflect the deep frustration of the Iranian elite, who recognize the extent of their loss of strategic influence.

The situation in the region has become not only a foreign policy disaster for Iran but also an internal challenge, further exacerbating divisions within Iranian society. Tensions are rising between reformist forces advocating for dialogue with the West and conservatives who insist that maintaining a hardline approach is the only way to retain influence and control. This divide is further intensified by the anticipated power transition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to his son Mojtaba Khamenei, which, according to many analysts, could occur as early as 2025. This transition is likely to trigger a new wave of domestic political conflicts. Increasingly, there are fears that the Islamic Republic could face internal fractures, potentially escalating into open conflict between various political and ethnic factions.

Adding to Iran’s woes is the looming threat of direct military confrontation with Israel, which continues to consolidate its position in the region. Taking advantage of Iran’s weakened state and the vulnerabilities of its allies, the Israeli military may seize the opportunity to target the remaining infrastructure linked to Iran, further undermining Tehran’s ability to safeguard its interests. Thus, the fall of Damascus is not merely a localized event but a symbol of Iran’s systemic crisis – one that is reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East and may lead to profound changes both within Iran and across the region.

The Syrian crisis is not just a localized conflict but another regional and global confrontation element. It is evident that Western nations, led by the United States and its Middle Eastern allies, are backing the actions of rebels, opposition groups, and terrorist organizations. A clear indication of this is the recent interview given by HTS leader al-Julani to the American network CNN, even though HTS is officially designated as a terrorist organization by the US. This demonstrates the political support extended by Western nations, who view such groups as tools for achieving their geopolitical objectives in the region, even if it contradicts their proclaimed fight against terrorism.

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Russian ships still at Tartus base – Lavrov

However, the assault was not limited to Syria or Iran; it also targeted Russia’s interests in the Middle East. Western nations, spearheaded by Washington and London, have long expressed dissatisfaction with Moscow’s growing influence in the region over the past decade. Acting as a key ally of Assad and forging successful relationships with several Middle Eastern states, Russia had emerged as a critical player in this strategically vital area. Moscow’s military and diplomatic achievements deeply unsettled the West, including its role in conflict resolution and cooperation with nations such as Türkiye, Iran, and Gulf states. The undermining of the Syrian regime was thus aimed at weakening Russia’s regional influence, stripping it of a key ally, and potentially ousting its military presence from Syria. While this could be seen as a blow to Moscow, suggesting that this significantly alters Russia’s broader Middle Eastern strategy or its relations with regional partners would be inaccurate.

Washington, London and their allies are not merely fighting to maintain control over the Middle East; they are striving to solidify their dominance on the global stage. Their actions demonstrate a willingness to use any means, including support for terrorist organizations, to achieve strategic objectives. This conflict is another theater of global confrontation, where the struggle for influence in the Middle East is directly tied to the West’s efforts to retain its global supremacy.

Türkiye, meanwhile, emerges as another potential beneficiary, celebrating Assad’s fall alongside opposition forces. While Ankara’s goals may align with the Syrian opposition’s, these events are unlikely to unfold directly with Türkiye. More plausibly, Ankara has reacted to the unfolding developments, seeking to portray itself as instrumental in the opposition’s success. Regardless of the specifics, this may lead to a cooling of relations between Moscow and Ankara, mainly if Türkiye is found to have played a direct role in coordinating events in Syria, violating previous agreements.

It is far too early to declare an end to Syria’s turmoil, as the experience of Libya vividly illustrates that regime change seldom leads to stability. Following Muammar Gaddafi’s overthrow, Libya failed to achieve peace, descending into a landscape of bloody wars, factional conflicts, and shattered hopes for millions. The country remains divided among rival factions, each pursuing its interests, leaving the population mired in chaos, insecurity, and the destruction of infrastructure. A similar fate may await Syria, where the fragile success of the opposition and its Western backers conceals the looming threat of protracted conflicts that could further fragment and exhaust the nation.

WEST FEARS HARDLINE ISLAMIST REGIME IN SYRIA – REUTERS.

There are concerns that a militant regime could replace Bashar Assad, according to the outlet.

FILE PHOTO. National Syrian Army soldiers celebrate taking control of Hama city. © Getty Images / Ugur Yildirim; dia images.

HomeWorld News
10 December 2024

Western and Arab countries are reportedly concerned that the fall of the Assad government in Syria could mean that more hardline Islamist forces could attempt to seize power in the country, according to Reuters.

Over the weekend, opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir-al-Sham (HTS) jihadist militants seized control over major cities, including Damascus. They deposed former President Bashar Assad, who left the country and has been granted asylum in Russia.

However, according to several diplomats and analysts who have spoken to Reuters, the US, Israel, and other Arab powers in the region fear that the lack of an apparent authority in Syria could lead to instability and extremism.

“There is strong fear inside and outside the region of the power vacuum that Assad’s sudden collapse may cause,” Abdelaziz al-Sager, the director of the Gulf Research Center think tank, told Reuters, pointing to past civil wars that followed the toppling of the governments of Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011.

One Western diplomat also told the outlet that given how fragmented the opposition forces are, there is currently no clear plan for how to rule Syria and manage its complex population, which consists of multiple sects and ethnic groups.

READ MORE: Opposition leader appointed PM in Syria

The diplomat expressed fear that Syria could descend into lawlessness, which could allow for the flourishing of extremist groups such as Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS).

However, Israeli experts believe that despite the risk of chaos engulfing Syria, the fall of Assad’s government could still prove to be beneficial for the Jewish state.

“Despite concerns over the rise of extremist elements near the border and the lack of a clear authority in charge, the military capabilities of the rebels, in their various forms, aren’t comparable to those of Iran and its proxies,” Carmit Valensi, a senior researcher at an Israeli think tank, told Reuters.

US President Joe Biden has also celebrated Assad’s fall but has acknowledged that the sudden change of power created a period of “risk and uncertainty” for Syria. Over the past two days, US forces have conducted dozens of airstrikes against IS positions in Syria to prevent the terrorist group from reasserting itself.

Washington has also supported Israel’s advance past the demilitarized buffer zone with Syria at the Golan Heights. The Israel Defense Forces claimed that the incursion was meant to prevent Syrian-based militants from taking over the border areas and launching an offensive into Israel in the future.

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