Our Friday News Analysis | What the World Reads Now!

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with military chiefs in Moscow on November 22. / Photo by Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool/AFP via Getty Images.

By Seymour Hersh
Substack.com
26 November 2024

There is a scene early on in Nathanael West’s satirical 1933 novella, Miss Lonelyhearts, that reeks of depression, despair, and genius. It’s hard to forget.

The protagonist is a lovelorn advice columnist for a newspaper in New York City who receives a letter from a teenage girl who describes herself as having the makings of a beauty with a slender figure many rave about. Still, she bitterly notes she has never had a date. Can it be, she asks, because she has no nose?

The scene came to mind this week as I considered the bitterness of President Joe Biden, who seems to be full of resentment because a group of Democratic Party bigwigs, aware that he was failing, forced him to give up his planned re-election campaign and turn over the fight against Donald Trump to Vice President Kamala Harris, and all the more resentment because she failed to beat Trump as Biden did in 2020.

The president is no longer talking about his failed policy in the Middle East, though American bombs and other weaponry are still flowing to Israel and being put to deadly use. Biden is now trying to stem the losses in Ukraine’s war with Russia. A week ago, he gave the Ukrainian government, headed by President Volodymyr Zelensky, permission to fire a long-withheld advanced American ballistic missile capable of hitting targets 190 miles inside Russia. Days later, he decided to provide Ukraine with landmines capable of maiming and killing all whose paths cross them, young and old, friendly and not.

I have been told that the strategic implications of the president’s escalation—both Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin have nuclear bombs at their fingertips—had not been thoroughly analyzed inside the Pentagon and that some essential offices, sure to have different views about escalation, were never asked for their input. Putin responded by escalating in turn by firing a nuclear-capable ballistic missile at Ukraine and said in a speech that what had been a regional conflict “had now acquired elements of a global character.” The New York Times noted that the response “was meant to instill fear in Kyiv and the West.”

Putin’s explicit warning came a day after Biden decided to permit the use of American anti-personnel landmines to slow Russian advances in the Donbas region. Neither Washington nor Moscow are signatories to the international mine ban treaty that 164 parties have signed, but international human rights groups widely criticized Biden’s decision to deploy the weapon.

Meanwhile, the Russian army, whose front-line troops are exhausted, continues to push forward against their even more understaffed and under-equipped enemy. Ukraine’s successful penetration into Kursk, the scene of a dramatic German defeat in World War II, is now the object of a brutal Russian counterattack, with huge Ukrainian losses in men and equipment. The long-term prognosis for the Ukrainian army remains dire.

Why is Putin, clearly angered at Biden’s willingness to let Zelensky launch missiles at Russian targets, amid his public talk of being at war now with NATO, not moving to go all in against the weakened Ukraine army and the capital of Kyiv?

The answer could be messaging from Donald Trump, perhaps relayed through a close associate, who has since his election been nominating the most inexperienced and politically radical cabinet in American history. Trump often makes the point in public that America was not at war during his first term as president, which ended in January 2021, conveniently forgetting the then-ongoing occupation of Afghanistan as well as US military operations elsewhere. He has been a consistent supporter of Israel and an all-out supporter of the current Israeli war against Hamas, which has morphed into the vicious targeting of the population of Gaza. His foreign policy appointments so far all share a zealous commitment to Israel and unquestioning support for its ongoing war.

Russia is another matter. In his September debate with Kamala Harris, Trump was precise about the war between Ukraine and Russia. What he said then is consistent with what I hear now in my reporting.

“If I were president,” Trump said, the war “would have never started. . . . I know Putin very well. He would have never. . . . gone into Ukraine and killed millions of people. . . . I’ll get the war with Russia and Ukraine ended.” At that point, he added, “If I am president-elect, I’ll get it done before even becoming president. . . . That is a war that’s dying to be settled.”

One of the moderators asked a gotcha question straight out of the Cold War: “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?” It was a question to which the vice president would have to say yes. Trump did not. “I want the war to stop,” he said. “I want to save lives that are being uselessly . . . killed by the millions.” A moment later, he added to Putin: “He’s got a thing that other people don’t have: he’s got nuclear weapons.”

Trump’s casualty numbers might have been off. Still, his consistency, especially when pressed, adds to the credibility of what I have been learning in recent weeks: that an understanding of the mechanisms for ending the war has been debated and discussed and even tentatively outlined between informal advisors to Trump and Putin and their teams. One American told me “the lines are open” between those representing the two men, with vague “assurances sent and received.”

I have also been told by experts in Washington who are knowledgeable about Russian political affairs that Putin does not want to settle with Zelensky “until he is good and ready.” He will wait until the successful Russian surge targeting Donetsk and Kursk plays out. Moscow is said to be concerned about extensive “stay-behind” intelligence and operational activity in Ukraine that is believed to be organized by American and British agencies.

One American expert told me that what is going on now is an attempt to change the long-standing American support for containment, exemplified by the Biden administration’s instinctive disdain for the governments of Russia and China, which marred the initial meetings with each in 2021. The Chinese delegation at the conference in Alaska early that year publicly walked out on Secretary of State Antony Blinken after accusing him and his delegation of attempting to interfere in internal Chinese matters.

Biden has criticized Putin publicly, calling him a “war criminal,” a “murderous dictator,” and a “pure thug.” 2011, during a one-on-one meeting in Moscow, he famously claimed that he looked into Putin's eyes and said, “I don’t think you have a soul.” Putin replied, according to Biden, “We understand one another.”

This is not a brief for Putin, a former Soviet intelligence agent who is brutal to his political opponents and runs a government that is quick to put foreign journalists in jail. He is also considered by many in the American intelligence community to be a competent and informed leader.

I was told that Trump’s agenda once in office was to find a way to avoid being haunted by worries about contacts with those who dissent from America’s foreign policy. Hence, the idea of working more with military-to-military negotiations is a start. One American told me that “reality over politics and history over headlines” would be a fresh way to close out the murderous war between Russia and Ukraine.

Such tactics are not going to solve the crisis in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. Still, there must be a better approach than bowing to the Israeli religious right and Benjamin Netanyahu. That will be a test for the president-to-be, whose choices for cabinet roles have left official Washington and the press agog. Ending the war between Ukraine and Russia will be a start.

There was no way Joe Biden would get it done without much more blood being shed.

What is the Side of the Story that is Not Yet Decisive? Edited by Abraham A. van Kempen

VIEW | COL DOUGLAS MACGREGOR: PUNISHING RUSSIA – REAL REASON FOR THE UKRAINE WAR

Watch the Video Here (12 minutes, 6 seconds)

CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON AND THE FUTURE OF RESISTANCE TO ISRAEL

The ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel has accomplished Israel’s goal of decoupling Gaza from Lebanon. However, while the future of the Axis of Resistance remains unclear, so does Israel’s strategic path forward.

Supporters Of Lebanon’s Iran-Allied Hezbollah Movement Waved Flags As They Attended A Mass Rally And A Televised Speech By Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, On January 3, 2023 In Lebanon, Beirut (Photo: Marwan Naamani/Dpa Via Zuma Press/Apaimages)

By Abdaljawad Omar
Mondoweiss.Net
27 November 2024

The ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel can be approached through several lenses. The most significant is the cumulative blows that Israel has dealt to the Lebanese resistance, systematically targeting its cadre, leadership, and operational capabilities since September. These operations have raised the cost of Hezbollah’s “unity of fields” strategy, signaling that maintaining an active military posture across multiple fronts takes a more significant toll than anticipated. Signs had already begun to surface suggesting that Hezbollah was prepared to entertain a ceasefire, provided it allowed them to preserve their operational standing, safeguard the integrity of southern Lebanon, and uphold their ontological narrative of resistance.

The Israeli military apparatus, intelligence services, and security network will likely view this campaign as successful. They have effectively ended the reign of several first-generation Hezbollah cadres, demonstrated their ability to infiltrate and assassinate critical leaders, and inflicted widespread punishment on the “social world” from which Hezbollah draws its strength. Looking ahead, Israel will closely monitor who assumes leadership within Hezbollah, hoping for a shift toward figures akin to those of the past who might advocate restraint.

Yet, over the past several weeks, the limits of Israeli military strategy—typically structured around short, sharp, and decisive engagements—have become increasingly apparent. Hezbollah did not crumble under the pressure of the ground invasion. Instead, it recovered much of its operational capacity, retaining its position as a formidable military actor while preventing any agreement that would disarm it or establish a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

The ceasefire agreement offers Israel one notable achievement: the decoupling of Gaza from Lebanon. However, on all other fronts, it failed to deliver the decisive outcomes that Israel sought.

This agreement also carries significant implications for the Israeli settlements near the border with Lebanon. The rhetoric of total victory has been replaced by a pragmatic willingness to withdraw, restoring a status quo ante similar to the pre-war period. Despite tactical successes, residents of these settlements remain acutely aware that Hezbollah’s presence and capabilities persist. Convincing thousands to return will be challenging, likely requiring substantial financial incentives and investments to rebuild confidence and security.

On the other side, the war exposed vulnerabilities within Hezbollah, which will undoubtedly shape its internal reconstruction and lead to a reassessment of its operational assumptions. These vulnerabilities include the organization’s exposure to Israeli and Western intelligence, the inability or unwillingness to employ more of its firepower, and the cost of deferring the confrontation with Israel for more than seventeen years.

However, a critical question and fight will follow this round: Does Hezbollah risk retreating into isolationist ideologies tethered solely to the Lebanese state, especially after losing much of its central leadership? Such a shift could undermine its broader regional ambitions, weaken its strategic effectiveness in future confrontations with Israel, or transform it into yet another sectarian party in the fraught Lebanese political scene. It might also encourage internal voices advocating for a status quo of non-confrontation with Israel, fundamentally altering its role in the resistance axis.

Gaza is left isolated, but Israel is fatigued and splintering.

Israel has successfully decoupled the Lebanese front from Gaza, effectively ending the attrition along its northern border. This maneuver has left Gaza and its resistance isolated, facing the total weight of Israeli military and political pressure. While support may still emerge from other fronts, notably Yemen, Gaza’s leverage in negotiations has been significantly diminished, reducing its bargaining power.

This decoupling also allows Israel to advance its war plans in Gaza, albeit with several caveats. The first challenge lies in Israel’s broader strategic intention: reasserting control over Gaza for the foreseeable future. Israel’s military return to the strip raises questions about the sustainability of such a move, the costs of governance, and the long-term implications for its domestic and international standing. The logistical, political, and social complexities of maintaining control in such a contested territory present formidable obstacles, specifically when it has failed to defeat Hamas or end its influence in the Strip.

Secondly, Israel’s plans for settlement expansion in Gaza, annexation of land, redrawing the border, and a continued presence in the Philadelphi Corridor and other strategic areas reflect a more bottomless settler-colonial ambition. These plans aim to consolidate territorial dominance but come with significant risks. Sustained Palestinian resistance, combined with the logistical and ethical complexities of imposing settler-colonial structures, makes such objectives precarious. The transfer of settlers into Gaza demands a degree of stability and acquiescence from the local population that seems improbable under the current conditions. Furthermore, these plans complicate Israel’s position regarding the return of captives, presenting a critical contradiction in its strategic calculus.

These contradictions are now poised to dominate Israel’s political landscape. After more than a year of war, fatigue, and weariness settle in, challenging the narrative of total victory. Signs of pragmatism are emerging, with growing segments of Israeli society—particularly over recent months—expressing a desire to end the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This sentiment underscores a tension between the state’s expansive military ambitions and the public’s increasing demand for stability and resolution, a return to life without war.

However, these dynamics unfold against the backdrop of a right-wing government fixated on ethnic cleansing and settlement expansion. The sacrifice of the captives, a central concern for Israel’s left-leaning factions, will exacerbate the internal struggles over Netanyahu’s corruption and intersect with the controversial legal reforms championed by the Religious Zionist bloc. This broader project to redefine the state’s identity could deepen societal fractures, polarize the political arena, and intensify the ongoing battle over the future trajectory of Israel.

Unity of Fields

The “unity of fields” strategy, as practiced by the axis of resistance, rests on a delicate balance of ambiguity and flexibility. It binds its constituent forces to a shared strategic narrative and overarching goal while allowing each geographic context to define the scope and nature of its engagement. This dual approach—unified in vision yet localized in execution—has enabled the resistance to adapt to diverse terrains and leverage specific dynamics without compromising the coherence of its broader framework.

The current war has illuminated this strategy’s strengths and vulnerabilities. Among its successes is the synchronization of various fronts, which has created multiple dilemmas for Israel across different theaters of operation. This prolonged conflict has not only drained Israel’s resources but has also deepened its dependence on Western powers, exposing the fragility of its hegemonic ambitions. The resistance’s ability to sustain pressure on Israel from various directions has demonstrated the efficacy of a decentralized yet interconnected struggle model.

However, this strategy has its challenges. It reveals tensions inherent in the resistance's constituent forces' differing geographies, ideologies, and social contexts. These contradictions strain the cohesion of the “unity of fields” approach, highlighting the difficulty of maintaining a unified front when local realities diverge from the collective narrative. The balancing act between shared objectives and localized constraints remains a persistent test for the long-term viability of this strategy.

Had the Lebanese front been isolated from the year-long war in Gaza, the outcomes for Hezbollah might have been markedly different. In many ways, Hezbollah has borne the cost of the “unity of fields” strategy, enduring significant losses in cadre, leadership, and operational capacity. Yet, it has also benefited from this interconnected framework. The decapitation strikes, targeted assassinations, and intelligence-driven operations conducted by Israel—relying on tools such as pagers and intercepted communications—occurred within the broader context of Gaza’s resistance. This context, coupled with the fatigue of Israeli forces after extended operations in Gaza, diluted the impact of Israel’s offensive on Hezbollah.

Without the backdrop of Gaza’s ongoing resistance, these operations might have inflicted far more significant damage on Hezbollah. The alignment with Gaza, therefore, not only diffused Israel’s military focus but also provided Hezbollah with critical breathing space to recalibrate its strategies. The prolonged conflict in Gaza has stretched Israel’s resources, strained its military capacities, and undermined the morale of its reserve forces. Combined with the strategic coherence provided by the “unity of fields,” these conditions allowed Hezbollah to maintain its resilience and maneuver politically and militarily.

The trajectory of the “unity of fields” strategy remains uncertain. Will the constituent forces retreat into an isolationist posture, tethered to localized concerns, or will they sustain their broader anti-hegemonic stance in the region? The answers to these questions will shape the future of the axis of resistance and its ability to navigate the complex interplay of regional and global power dynamics.

Total victory or sufficient success?

The ceasefire agreement with Lebanon fractures the Israeli drive for total victory. It also signals the beginning of its implosion under the weight of reality.

Israel now faces a host of challenges: pending warrants in the ICC, fractures in its historical narrative, and the strategic paradox of pursuing a decisive resolution to the Palestinian issue without actually resolving it, with the possibility of only changing the terms and conditions of the struggle.

This, in itself, is one of the successes of the “unity of fields.” It forced Israel into a prolonged war—a war Israel initially embraced and sought—but one that ultimately has the potential to reshape its understanding of what military power can and cannot achieve. The enduring conflict has tested the limits of its strategy and exposed the contradictions inherent in its reliance on force as a means of sustaining Jewish supremacy in Palestine.

The Israeli narrative will inevitably undergo a subtle mutation—from proclamations of total victory to the more modest concession of sufficient victory. Yet even this sufficiency, this precarious resting place, will give way to the persistent, unyielding antagonisms that underpin its contemporary social fabric. These antagonisms will define not only its relationship to the Palestinians—those inconvenient reminders of an unresolved history—but also its internal reckoning, the fractures and fault lines it cannot escape within itself.

VIEW | CAN EUROPE RETURN TO REASON AND REVERSE ITS DECLINE?

Jeffrey Sachs, Alexander Mercouris, and Glenn Diesen.

Watch the Video Here (31 minutes, 59 seconds)

By Glenn Diesen

Substack.com
27 November 2024

I spoke with Jeffrey Sachs and Alexander Mercouris about the political changes in Europe. The optimism of the European project as a region of peace and prosperity is long gone. The objective had been to peacefully resolve conflicts on the continent and use collective bargaining power to establish more significant economic and political independence. Instead, the continent is experiencing war, de-industrialization, socio-economic and political instability, excessive dependence on the US, and growing irrelevance in the broader world. What went wrong, and can the decline be reversed?

The rest of the world adjusts to the emerging multipolarity with a multivector foreign policy by diversifying economic connectivity to improve economic competitiveness and enhance political autonomy. In contrast, the Europeans have subordinated themselves entirely to the US and thus suffer from economic decline and political subordination. Declining rationality is also an apparent problem as the Europeans pursued policies towards Russia that they knew would put them on a collision course with Russia. Instead of pursuing course correction, the proxy war with Russia increased the security dependence on the US, which enabled Washington to impose bloc discipline.

Europe's recovery requires reversing the militarisation of its dividing lines and diversifying its economic ties to avoid excessive dependence on any one state or region.

VIEW | COL. DOUGLAS MACGREGOR: HOW CLOSE TO WORLD WAR III?

Judging Freedom with Judge Andrew Napolitano

Watch the Video Here (34 minutes, 58 seconds)

Host: Judge Andrew Napolitano
Judging Freedom
26 November 2024

UKRAINE CAN MAKE AMERICA RICH – TRUMP ALLY

Senator Lindsey Graham has said that the country has rare earth minerals worth trillions and is ready to make a deal with the US.

FILE PHOTO: Lindsey Graham. © Global Look Press / CNP / Rod Lamkey

HomeWorld News
24 November 2024

Senator Lindsey Graham has said Ukraine could benefit the US because it is rich in valuable natural resources and willing to negotiate an extraction agreement with Washington.

The Republican senator from South Carolina told Fox News that the Ukraine conflict is ultimately “about money.” An interview extract was published on the senator’s YouTube channel on Wednesday. “You know that the richest country in Europe for rare earth minerals is Ukraine?” he said, estimating the worth at 2 to 7 trillion dollars.

Graham added that Ukraine is ready to “do a deal with us,” but not Russia. “So it’s in our interest to make sure that Russia doesn’t take over the place,” he said, describing Ukraine as the “breadbasket of the world.”

Read more
Trump eyes ex-intelligence chief as special envoy for Ukraine – Reuters.

“We can make money and have an economic relationship with Ukraine. It would benefit us with peace,” Graham said. “Donald Trump will make a deal to get our money back and enrich ourselves with rare earth minerals. A good deal for Ukraine and us.”

He added that the president-elect would also help settle the conflict by concluding an “honorable deal” to avoid “humiliating” Russian President Vladimir Putin and setting the stage for another conflict.

“Donald Trump knows how to end wars. All Joe Biden knows how to do is start wars,” he said.

Graham is known for his hawkish stance on aiding Ukraine and containing Moscow. In February, he was added to Russia’s list of ‘terrorists and extremists’ after the senator advocated for designating Russia as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism.’ In 2023, Moscow expressed outrage over Graham’s remarks during a meeting with Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky when he said: “The Russians are dying. The best money we’ve ever spent.”

In mid-October, Zelensky presented his ‘victory plan,’ which stated that Kyiv is ready to sign “a special agreement on the joint protection of the available critical resources” with its Western backers in Ukraine.

Earlier this month, Mikhail Podoliak, a top adviser to Zelensky, also stressed that Ukraine has “deposits of rare minerals, such as lithium and titanium, which we can exploit together [with the US].”

Trump has vowed to end the Ukraine conflict quickly. Media reports have suggested that he may try to force Ukraine to abandon its NATO ambitions and negotiate a freeze on the conflict. However, Moscow has ruled out a freeze along the current front line, insisting that its military operation's objectives must be achieved.

WARNING TO KYIV AND MISSILE REVELATIONS: KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PUTIN’S CSTO SUMMIT ADDRESS

The Russian president used the military alliance’s annual meeting to clarify crucial points about the current standoff with Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin. © Sputnik/Mikhail Tereshchenko

Edited by Abraham A. van Kempen
HomeRussia & Former Soviet Union
28 November 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed critical military and political issues to allies during his Thursday speech at the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The CSTO military alliance comprises Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Putin’s remarks provide new insights into Russia’s military strategies and objectives, particularly regarding Ukraine.

Here are the key takeaways from his address:

• Ukraine has launched attacks on Moscow and St. Petersburg. Kyiv has “repeatedly attempted” to strike Russia’s two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, Putin stated, pointing to Russia’s justification for retaliatory military actions.
• Putin warned that such attacks by Ukraine would only further escalate the situation.
• ‘Decision-making centers’ in Kyiv could become targets for Oreshnik strikes.

Putin indicated that Russia would hit key Ukrainian strategic operational centers using its new hypersonic Oreshnik missile system if necessary.

               “Military facilities, defense industry enterprises, and decision-making centers in Kyiv may become targets for strikes. These will be selected based on the nature of the threats posed by Ukraine to Russia,” he said.

According to Putin, the Oreshnik missile has no equivalent in the world, and its testing and deployment is a response to continued Ukrainian missile strikes on Russian territory.

Russia already has hypersonic weapons ready for use.

Putin confirmed that Russia has multiple Oreshnik missile systems ready for deployment.

               “We have several ready-to-use products available today,” he remarked, highlighting Moscow’s advanced hypersonic missile capabilities.

The Russian leader described the Oreshnik system as:

               operating at speeds up to Mach 10 with a destructive power comparable to that of nuclear weapons, making it highly effective against even sincerely protected targets.

               The system is one of Russia’s most advanced weapons, and many experts believe its deployment could significantly alter the balance of power in the Ukraine conflict.

Read more
Ukraine settlement ‘long way off’ – Lavrov

Russia has a significant missile production advantage over NATO.

Putin stressed Moscow’s overwhelming missile production capacity, declaring that:

               “Russia produces ten times more long-range weapons than all NATO countries combined.”

He added that Russia would accelerate manufacturing in 2025, when

               “production will increase by another 25-30%,” emphasizing the country’s military-industrial capacity scale.

‘Illegitimate’ authorities in Kyiv have no right to give orders to the Ukrainian armed forces.

In a pointed political statement, Putin declared that the Ukrainian government under Vladimir Zelensky is illegitimate due to the expiration of his presidential term last summer.

               “The authorities in Kyiv are usurpers of power,” he said.

This reflects Russia’s growing concerns over Ukraine’s government and leadership legitimacy.

               “From a legal point of view, the Ukrainian authorities no longer have the right to command the armed forces,” Putin stated.

Zelensky has refused to hold new elections.

Last week, the American Political Services international consulting firm commissioned an opinion poll that showed only 16% of Ukrainians would vote for him in a new contest.

BUILDING THE BRIDGE! | A WAY TO GET TO KNOW THE OTHER AND ONE ANOTHER

Making a Difference – The Means, Methods, and Mechanism for Many to Move Mountains

Photo Credit: Abraham A. van Kempen, our home away from home on the Dead Sea

By Abraham A. van Kempen
Senior Editor
Updated 19 January 2024

Those who commit to 'healing our broken humanity' build intercultural bridges to learn to know and understand one another and others. Readers who thumb through the Building the Bridge (BTB) pages are not mindless sheep following other mindless sheep. They THINK. They want to be at the forefront of making a difference. They're in search of the bigger picture to expand their horizons. They don't need BTB or anyone else to confirm their biases.

Making a Difference – The Means, Methods, and Mechanism for Many to Move Mountains

Accurate knowledge promotes understanding, dispels prejudice, and awakens the desire to learn more. Words have an extraordinary power to bring people together, divide them, forge bonds of friendship, or provoke hostility. Modern technology offers unprecedented possibilities for good, fostering harmony and reconciliation. Yet its misuse can do untold harm, leading to misunderstanding, prejudice, and conflict.

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