Our Friday News Analysis | What the World Reads Now!

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By Glenn Diesen
Substack.com
19 September 2024

I discussed US hegemony's demise and the multipolar world's emergence with Host SL Kanthan on the Geopolitics Demystified (GD) Talk Show. The multipolar world is already here, but reluctance to adjust to new realities fuels conflicts worldwide.

A fundamental problem in the West now is the lack of political imagination to address the new political realities in the world. For the first time in centuries, the West will no longer be in a position to lead the world. This was a devastating challenge for Western leaders who emerged after the Cold War. They believed this was the “end of history,” in which the world would unite under liberal democracy and the leadership of the collective West in perpetuity.

It should concern us that none of our leaders can envision or want to discuss the role of the West in a multipolar world where non-Western centers of power should have an equal say. The first and only instinct is to retreat into bloc politics to defeat other centers of power so we can return to the “normal” order of Western dominance. We tend to normalize and legitimize this confrontational approach to international affairs by framing the power struggle as a moral struggle of liberal democracy versus authoritarianism.

Yet, the US is not able to roll back China's technological and economic rise, and NATO is not able to defeat Russia militarily, economically, or isolate it internationally. All the efforts to restore unipolarity are weakening the West and intensifying the rest of the world's efforts to develop a new international economic infrastructure that reflects multipolar realities.

What will the West do? Adjust to the new realities and explore the latest international power distribution opportunities, or retreat further into the bunker mentality and believe that the glorious past can be restored in a grand showdown?

What is the Side of the Story that is Not Yet Decisive? Edited by Abraham A. van Kempen.

THE RULES-BASED ORDER VS. THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY

The rules-based order and the defense of democracy have become widely used political frames in the West. While the former concept remains relevant in today’s geopolitical context, the latter requires a considerable rethink.

Source: Getty

By Stefan Lehne
CARNEGIE EUROPE
18 September 2024

Following the end of the Cold War, Western elites dreamed of a liberal world order based on democracy, the rule of law, and a liberal market economy. However, the brutal resurgence of geopolitics at the beginning of this century killed off this dream and forced the West to reframe its foreign policies. Led by the United States, the West turned to two political concepts. Firstly, a rules-based order was meant to rally the broadest possible group of countries against the disruptors, namely China and Russia. Second, a defense of democracy narrative also aimed at alerting domestic audiences to the challenge from authoritarian rivals and strengthening the bond with Western allies.

The rules-based order enjoys considerable support, including from some non-Western governments. By contrast, the United States’ narrative concerning. An epochal global struggle between democrats and authoritarians, as exemplified in the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, found only lukewarm buy-in, even among Western allies. The former frame will remain relevant in the future as it deals with the crucial question of whether a multipolar world can still be rules-based. The latter, however, will need considerable rethinking, even if it survives the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

The Uses of Political Frames

Throughout history, leaders have framed their foreign and military policies ideologically. Some leaders have deployed such ideas cynically to disguise their real motives of maximizing power and remaining in charge. Still, others have been true believers ready for great sacrifices to promote their ideals. Religion was a long time's primary source of such framings, as were claims of dynastic destiny. More recently, progress, liberty, and nationalism gained prominence.

Whatever their substance, political framings fulfill several crucial functions. They provide coherence for the policies of a state, rally citizens behind the leadership, and strengthen the identity of a political entity. They also sometimes serve to exclude and marginalize outsiders, who are vilified or even dehumanized.

Political frames can be directed primarily to domestic audiences but can also serve as foreign policy instruments, such as reaching out to allies or intimidating opponents. Depending on the prevailing power constellation, these frames either express an ambition to transform the international environment according to the respective state’s desires or are defensive and aim to protect interests and values perceived to be under external threat.

Ideological framings reached their peak in the twentieth century. The victory of communism in Russia and the rise of fascism in Europe turned international politics into a battle of ideas. The Soviet Union sought to advance the cause of world revolution by fomenting class struggle and insurrections worldwide. The Third Reich based its territorial aggression on the claimed racial superiority of the German people and their purported right to Lebensraum, or space to live. Japan used similar ideas to justify its expansionism in the Pacific and Asia.

The simultaneous onslaught from the political spectrum's right and left prompted the remaining democratic countries to develop their counterbalancing narratives. Defending freedom in its political, societal, and economic dimensions became their central rallying point in the struggle against fascism and, later, during the Cold War. The latter led to the emergence of the West as a nongeographic concept encompassing states committed to individual human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a liberal economic system.

The Rise and Fall of the Liberal World Order

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West entered a brief period of boundless optimism. The confidence that democracy and a liberal market economy would soon spread across the globe found expression in the concept of a liberal world order. However, the difficulty of turning this idea into reality soon became apparent. In 2002, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, then U.S. president George W. Bush designated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an “axis of evil” and accused them of sponsoring terrorism and seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The War on Terror became another prominent frame of U.S. foreign policy.

As the years passed, it became evident that the evil axis and other significant parts of the world were unwilling to buy into the concept of the liberal world order. Russia turned into an aggressive revisionist power committed to reversing its losses of the 1990s through territorial conquest and an extensive sphere of influence. Moscow came to consider the United States and its allies as Russia’s geopolitical opponents, the culprits of its earlier humiliation, and an obstacle to its return as a world power.

China continued its spectacular rise, but contrary to earlier Western expectations, greater prosperity did not go together with political liberalization and convergence with Western values. On the contrary, Beijing became more authoritarian internally and assertive in its external policies. China ramped up its global influence through its Belt and Road Initiative and massive trading and investment power. More than two decades after China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, which was seen as a commitment to a rules-based global regime, China strives to reshape the international political and economic order in line with its interests. It is also rapidly building up its military strength, pressuring Taiwan, and pursuing aggressive policies in the South China Sea.

The first quarter of the twenty-first century has thus been marked by the emergence of a multipolar global system centered on the U.S.-China rivalry, but in which India is rapidly rising, and Russia is struggling to remain in the first rank of significant powers. EU leaders have expressed geopolitical ambitions, but the bloc needs more coherence and hard power to deliver on these claims. However, multipolarity has also allowed several middle powers, from Indonesia to Turkey, to become significant geopolitical actors in their own right.

Under the pressure of geopolitics, the global economy shows signs of fragmentation amid a surge of protectionism in many places and the widespread weaponization of economic relations. The hope for further progress in the spread of democratic governance has been disappointing, as international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are now reporting eighteen years of democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism in many parts of the world.

From Liberal to Rules-Based Order

Thus, the world developed somewhat differently than Western politicians and pundits had expected in the 1990s. Paradoxically, this meant that the political concept of the West staged a comeback. At a time when the universal triumph of democracy and a liberal market economy was widely expected, the word “West” seemed about to be reduced to its geographic connotation. However, with significant parts of the world moving on a different track, North America, EU member states, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand again became aware of their distinctive characteristics.

The G7 grouping, comprising the most significant Western economies, also became prominent. Indeed, it is no longer the centerpiece of the global economic order that it was in the 1980s—the group’s collective share of the world’s GDP has declined from over 65 percent then to about 40 percent today—but it has become a significant platform of political coordination. Most of the sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine were first discussed in this framework. The organization of G7 summits, however, has evolved. In recent years, leaders of major non-Western countries, such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, have been regularly invited to parts of the meetings. This is meant to mitigate the risk that these events are perceived as reunions of the ancien régime.

The profound changes in the global balance of forces impacted how the West frames its foreign policies. The first victim was the liberal world order. As liberalism was retreating in many places, the concept no longer seemed realistic. Pretending to build a world order based on principles held only by a minority merely oppresses everyone else. But as liberal went out of fashion, a new adjective came to the fore. Western politicians now promote the idea of a rules-based world order in many speeches and documents on international politics.

President Obama's administration began using the concept widely around 2008 in the United States. During Donald Trump's presidency, whose all-dominating political frame was to Make America Great Again (MAGA), the rules-based order appeared rarely, but it staged a comeback under Biden. The concept also enjoys strong support in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Major Western organizations, including the EU and NATO, have committed themselves to this objective.

Significantly, some countries not part of the traditional Western camp have also signed up for it. A notable case is India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has referred to the rules-based order in various meetings with Western leaders but usually insists on adding “equitable” and “inclusive.” The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has also expressed its support. The particular popularity of this U.S.-coined concept in the Indo-Pacific is very likely related to the dramatic rise of Chinese power in the region.

The Pushback

As a political frame, the rules-based order is designed for international rather than internal consumption. It urges governments and nonstate actors to respect the rules that underpin a stable global system. As few actors openly oppose overthrowing the international order, this frame is meant to find broad support worldwide.

Yet, despite its apparent blandness, the concept was bound to be controversial, as it was developed and deployed in the context of geopolitical competition. China and Russia both strongly object to the idea. In their view, Western countries are trying to impose their unipolar model of the world order, in which a small number of countries make the rules, and the large majority has to abide by them. Beijing and Moscow emphasize that international regulations must be agreed on by all and applied without double standards.

The somewhat amorphous character of the rules-based order has also prompted criticism from experts in the West. Historically, the U.S. approach to international legal norms has often been selective. For instance, the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which currently has 124 members. Some international lawyers are concerned that Washington might promote the rules-based order as an alternative to global law based on an interpretation of rules favorable to U.S. interests. The harsh responses of the U.S. and United Kingdom governments to measures taken by international courts against Israel in the context of the ongoing war in Gaza have reinforced this criticism.

How the rules-based order relates to public international law needs to be clarified. There is no generally accepted definition of the concept. European governments and the EU often use the term essentially synonymous with international law and frequently combine the two concepts in the same sentence or paragraph. The U.S. understanding of the rules-based order appears to be broader, encompassing not only international law but also nonbinding norms and standards, potentially including some that are not universally accepted. In statements about the rules-based order, U.S. politicians sometimes evoke broad values, such as respect for sovereignty, self-determination, or human rights, rather than concrete legal norms.

Another problem that limits the concept's attractiveness for countries in the Global South is the West’s severely damaged reputation. The legacy of the colonial period remains a heavy burden, but it is now combined with accusations of double standards and hypocrisy. For example, the initial reluctance of Western governments to share COVID-19 vaccines triggered a wave of criticism in Africa. Southern governments also contrast the West’s engagement with Ukraine with its neglect of conflicts and challenges in the South. Most recently, Western support for Israel in the Gaza war has further sharpened this resentment. The problem is compounded by persistent economic inequality. From a Southern point of view, Western states continue to impose unfavorable trade and investment rules on the South while turning increasingly to protectionist strategies.

Against this background, it is unsurprising that Western sermonizing about the rules-based order is often perceived as an attempt to shore up an inequitable global status quo based on rules shaped by the U.S.-led West and serving to protect its interests and power. Of course, China and Russia are working hard to reinforce this perception.

Enhancing the Appeal of the Rules-Based Order

Despite these difficulties and problems, the rules-based order as a political frame still has considerable merits. One of the crucial questions in the coming years will doubtless be whether a multipolar world can still be rules-based. Will it descend into an unconstrained struggle for global hegemony, accompanied by arms races, attempts to carve up the world into zones of influence, and the weaponization of economic relationships? Or will it be possible to contain the inevitable competition through shared respect for some fundamental rules and, in doing so, preserve a space for joint efforts to confront urgent transnational challenges?

The vast majority of governments worldwide would undoubtedly choose the second option. They are well aware that the multiple interdependencies of a modern economy require close cooperation based on international rules and institutions. The rules-based order makes eminent sense as a universal concept promoting such a constructive approach. Three points seem relevant to broaden its appeal and address the abovementioned problems.

First, reducing the ambiguities in the relationship between the rules-based order and international law would be helpful. All the basic rules necessary for a stable global system are found in the UN Charter and the multiple treaties anchored in the UN. Explicit support for this body of law would alleviate most of the suspicions about possible hidden motives behind the concept. It would also assist the work of the international courts, which have come under severe strain in the geopolitical era.

Second, Western politicians should underline that the rules-based order is not about protecting and perpetuating the status quo. The rules are not set in stone but should be developed through an equitable process open to all interested parties. The concept's attractiveness would be much enhanced if its proponents committed to reforming international governance and addressing the legitimate grievances of Southern countries.

Third, and related to the above, promoting the rules-based order should be combined with a credible offer to modernize the existing multilateral system to allow developing countries and emerging economies to participate more equitably. This would involve fairer representation in multilateral forums and institutions, such as the UN Security Council, the G20, and the international financial institutions; thorough reform of multilateral development banks by ensuring adequate capitalization, improved debt resolution mechanisms, and an updated quota system; and the mobilization of significant additional funding for the climate transition and the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals.

The Defense of Democracy

One of the incurable deficits of the rules-based order as a political frame is that it is not well suited to domestic consumption. For ordinary citizens, the concept is too abstract to be meaningful and unlikely to inspire them to rally around the flag. This is probably one of the reasons why the Biden administration chose to complement the rules-based order with a second concept, the defense of democracy. This frame has a proud history in U.S. foreign policy, as it served as the central narrative during the struggles against fascism and communism in the twentieth century. By reviving this idea, the U.S. government aims to alert the American public to the seriousness of the authoritarian threat and mobilize democratic allies to confront the danger together.

The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy devoted a lot of space to the topic. It designated the countries that have taken the place of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as the main enemies of democracy:

The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to international peace and stability—especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order. Many non-democracies join the world’s democracies in forswearing these behaviors. Unfortunately, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) do not.

Between 2021 and 2024, the U.S. government organized three Summits for Democracy, at which participants were invited to announce commitments, reforms, and initiatives to defend democracy and human rights at home and abroad. The participation of 110 governments showed Washington’s impressive convening power, but the invitation policy also triggered considerable criticism. The United States excluded some governments with authoritarian tendencies, such as those of Hungary and Turkey. Still, it included others with equally bad or worse records, such as Iraq, Pakistan, and Serbia. Geopolitical considerations played a role in determining the guest list, not only the quality of democratic governance.

In addressing the first summits, Biden chose dramatic words, calling the struggle between democracies and autocracies “the defining challenge of our time.” Western allies of the United States generally supported Biden’s emphasis on protecting and promoting democracy. Still, they were reluctant to endorse the U.S. administration’s stark vision of a world divided into an authoritarian and a democratic camp. While European and U.S. views are broadly aligned in denouncing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorial regime, many European governments are more reluctant to highlight governance issues in China and other rising powers in the South. Altogether, the buy-in of Western allies into the democracy-versus-authoritarianism frame was considerably more muted than their support for the narrative of the rules-based order.

The Flaws in the Democracy-Versus-Authoritarianism Paradigm

The U.S. approach has several difficulties. In the context of the geopolitical rivalry between China and Russia, it is entirely legitimate to highlight the two sides’ different modes of governance. Undeniably, the authoritarianism of these countries is a significant part of the problem. However, presenting the current international situation as a Manichaean struggle between authoritarian darkness and democratic light is neither intellectually coherent nor politically astute.

Unlike in the ideological struggles of the twentieth century, the dividing lines are less clear-cut today. As the reports of leading NGOs in this field show, there is a broad range in the quality of democratic governance, and many shades of authoritarianism escape a simplistic binary categorization. Also, geopolitics compels the United States and other Western governments to seek close cooperation with several nondemocratic regimes. The recent reconciliation between the Biden administration and the Saudi government is one case among many. The rhetorical commitment to the defense of democracy, therefore, clashes with the reality of a Western foreign policy, which is often determined by geopolitical considerations. Accusations of hypocrisy and double standards are inevitable.

Democracy promotion, of course, remains an important objective. The Biden administration has significantly increased its aid programs in this area, and there appears to be some convergence with the relevant efforts of EU countries. However, mixing up democracy promotion with the ideological confrontation between China and Russia will probably hurt one objective without much helping the other. Beijing and Moscow will ramp up their polemics by denouncing the West’s democracy promotion policies as blatant propaganda. Countries interested in staying outside the geopolitical rivalry will likely be more reluctant to engage in Western-supported pro-democracy projects. Moreover, as the rather lukewarm responses of European governments have shown, the motivational effect of the Summits for Democracy has proved modest.

Finally, this is not the best time to boast about the superiority of democratic governance. In many Western countries, democracy is more fragile and vulnerable than in many years. Rampant polarization in the United States erodes the common ground essential for a functioning democracy. In Europe, too, there are worrying trends, such as democratic backsliding in some EU member states and the relentless rise of radical-right parties. These developments diminish the persuasive powers of Western politicians who make the case for democracy.

The future fate of this political frame depends on the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Should Trump return as president, this framing will be rapidly replaced by a return to MAGA, possibly in an even more aggressive version. Kamala Harris would likely continue many of the Biden administration’s policies. In her August 2024 speech accepting the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, she promised not to cozy up to tyrants and dictators—in contrast to Trump. However, she is also reported to be more cautious than Biden in presenting global affairs as a battle between democracy and tyranny. A Harris administration might thus choose to end the warlike rhetoric and decouple the promotion of democracy from the geopolitical confrontation.

Conclusion

As in earlier centuries, political frames will, in the future, have an essential role in legitimizing foreign policy, rallying populations around the flag, reinforcing bonds with allies, and signaling intentions to rivals. Of the two currently dominant Western political frames—the rules-based order and the defense of democracy—the first has not only received strong backing from Western allies but also found some support beyond them, particularly from countries in the Indo-Pacific concerned about China's rise.

Unsurprisingly, China and Russia have denounced the concept as an effort to perpetuate Western hegemony. Still, some criticism has been of the uncertain relationship between the rules-based order and international law. To enhance the concept’s appeal, Western countries should emphasize their commitment to international law as the foundation of such an order and show a credible readiness to reform the multilateral global system through an equitable and inclusive process. Ensuring that a multipolar world can also be based on commonly accepted and respected rules will be a crucial challenge in future years. The rules-based order is, therefore, likely to retain its relevance.

This is less evident regarding the second frame, the defense of democracy. The shared commitment to democratic values and the rule of law is—and will remain—a strong bond among the countries of the nongeographic West. Likewise, helping the development of democratic governance in other countries will continue to be a critical shared objective. However, Biden’s presentation of the current world situation as an epochal struggle between democracies and authoritarian states is at odds with the facts and politically unwise. This approach has received tepid support from other Western countries and minimal buy-in elsewhere. Therefore, a new U.S. administration should desist from weaponizing democracy in the geopolitical confrontation and instead strengthen and coordinate Western action to support democratic governance.

Stefan Lehne
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

VIEW | ECONOMIST PROFESSOR D. JEFFREY SACHS: UKRAINE, ISRAEL, AND DIPLOMATIC FAILURES

Judge Napolitano – Judging Freedom

Watch the Video Here (31 Minutes, 11 Seconds)

Host: Judge Andrew P. Napolitano
Judging Freedom
17 September 2024

@БелорусскийРусскийБостон
Greetings from Boston from Russian Immigrants since 1992! We stand with Mother RUSSIA.

@brianvictorkeys3107
Bravo to Prof. Sachs for calling out British delusional foreign policy.

@freedomfan
As a child in Palestine ???????? I was shot multiple times by Israeli soldiers and Jewish settlers.

@emilbordon1329
I have a family, and I’m disgusted that politicians are endangering our existence with their warmongering attitudes.

@MikeJenson-e7u
Instead of arming Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan, US taxpayer money should be spent on infrastructure, healthcare, education, homelessness, etc.

@MikeJenson-e7u

Zelensky didn't try to prevent the conflict through diplomacy because he lacked honor and integrity. In 2014, there was a coup. Soon after, there was a massacre in Odessa (dozens of people were burned alive). Ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were treated as subhuman. Their language and culture were being oppressed. A civil war broke out due to the rise in ethnic tensions. For eight years, the Ukrainian military was indiscriminately shelling civilians living in Donbas.

None of this would have happened if Zelensky had honored the Minsk agreement and pledged neutrality. The eight-year civil war would have ended, and Donbas would have remained part of Ukraine. War is the ultimate failure of diplomacy. Zelensky, Poroshenko, Merkel, and Hollande admitted that Ukraine had no intention to honor the Minsk agreements.

Who didn't want peace? Who advised against the 2022 peace talks in April? Someone visited Zelensky in Kyiv when NATO began to expand eastwards, compromising Russia's national security. 

Russia clearly stated that Ukraine joining NATO was a red line (November 2021), and unfortunately, this concern was never taken seriously. The Russians openly stated that if nothing changes, we will be forced to act to defend our national security.

Enhancing the national security of one country at the expense of another is unacceptable. The Russians have legitimate security concerns. 20th September 2021: Ukraine launched military drills with the US and NATO. NATO is not a defensive alliance. NATO illegally bombed Yugoslavia (a direct violation of the U.N. Charter). We should never forget what they did to Libya,

Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Who blew up the pipeline, causing an environmental disaster?

Zelensky banned all opposition and arrested a leading priest. Zelensky tried to invoke Article 5 under pretenses. Remember the incident in Poland? Ethnic Russians living in Ukraine were treated as subhuman. Their language and culture were being oppressed. Poroshenko said, “Our children will go to schools and kindergartens—theirs will hide in the basements.”

Russians will never forget the 2014 Odessa massacre. The whole world needs to know about it. Why was Denis Kireev eliminated? He was a member of Ukraine's negotiating team during the peace negotiations. He wanted to help his country. Ukraine has a hit list. They target artists, journalists, and ordinary citizens.

Hundreds of children are on this list. 13-year-old Faina Savenkova was placed there. Pink Floyd's Roger Waters is on this list. Jimmy Dore (American stand-up comedian and podcaster) and Aaron Maté (Canadian writer and journalist) are on this list. There is evidence that Ukrainian troops have been indiscriminately shelling civilians in Donbas (they used petal mines and targeted areas where there was no military presence).

The Azov troops trapped in the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol used human shields. They refused to allow civilians to leave despite humanitarian corridors being present. Russia held a proposed cease-fire for the civilians to go, but Azov would not allow the civilians to leave. Ukraine has committed many acts of terrorism (car bombs and other forms of assassination). Darya Dugina (journalist) R.I.P.

The first terrorist attack on the Kerch bridge killed the truck driver and the individuals in the adjacent car (innocent civilian victims). The second terrorist attack on the Kerch bridge killed two parents and severely injured their young daughter.

I have done a lot of research, and writing this comment took me a long time. I have stated a lot of facts, and I have given my honest opinion. I have provided a summary of events that took place. To explain this whole situation in great detail, a book would need to be written. Hopefully, someone will write a UNBIASED book, stating facts and allowing the readers to form their judgments.

Everything I said can be fact-checked and verified.

@ohsweetmystery
At this point, Israel has completely gone rogue.

@vermaxusa
These men speak for the overwhelming majority of 'thinking' Americans.

@JP-ve7pp
"Britain is in its war posture disgusting because it has an imperial mindset without any capacity right now of Empire, thank goodness; but it still wants as much escalation as possible, so it's an extremely irresponsible country..." I am, alas, British, and I cannot agree more!

@terrylovesenegal
1 dag geleden (bewerkt)
What is so frightening is that the majority of Americans or Europeans do not know how close we are to a nuclear war. Thank you, Judge, for having Prof. Sachs on again today. A sane voice in a world of total madness if only he could be heard and listened to.

@GeorgePrice-vp6td
Let us pray that the Russians can stay rational until the adults return to the room.

@aldinhopailan79
I am always amazed by Prof. Sachs's integrity and wisdom. Thank you for bringing him to us.

@cdfHerze
The suffering of the people in Gaza is unspeakable; it's horrendous. We have exhausted the vocabulary of the English language to describe what has befallen them (us) since 1948️.

@bittertruth3295
It's a pity to see the people at the political leadership in the West toying with the lives of their citizens. What a SHAME.

@professoreilers
Greetings from South Africa BRICS + with appreciation

@philliphudson9092
The irony is that we in the West can only understand what is going on by listening to President Putin.

@Sticks-of-TNT-tf1tn

“We know they are lying.
They know they are lying.
They know we know they are lying.
We know THEY KNOW they are lying, but they are still lying.”

–Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

GUEST EDITORIAL | ISRAELIS WOULD RATHER BE LIED TO THAN FACE THE PAINFUL TRUTH

A protester wears a shirt depicting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a demonstration to demand the release of the hostages taken by Hamas in Tel Aviv in January. Credit: Leo Correa /AP

By Yossi Klein
Haaretz Israel | Opinion
14 February 2024

The government is against everyone. Against Hamas, Hezbollah, the army, and the public. Hamas doesn't care what happens to the Gazans; does the government care what happens to us? Like sailors abandoning a sinking ship, they care for themselves. Looting, taking everything they can and passing funds to friends, helping the ultra-Orthodox, ignoring the fighters.

The soldiers also understand that today, the government is fighting on their backs. They are its cannon fodder. They are neither out of touch nor idiots. They see where the money goes; they know the extension of reserve duty, the incompetence in dealing with the displaced Israelis, and. They are astounded to see how, every week, the war's goal changes. From "toppling Hamas" in the past to "absolute victory" now. Who knows what this "absolute victory" is for which they're sacrificing their lives?

The media knows. Journalists who can analyze every second in Sinwar's mind understand what happens in Netanyahu's. They know that "absolute victory" means preserving Netanyahu's rule. They know and keep silent. They know there are no other goals, no plans. No "day after." No toppling and no releasing. They all serve the same purpose: the fighters who will fall and the hostages who will be released. That's the goal, and from that, everything is derived. This is what must be mentioned in every report.

Journalists know, but they're not reporting what the public must know, only what the public wants to know. What doesn't it want to know? That its sons are fighting for Netanyahu. A survey conducted by Nimrod Nir and Nimrod Zeldin of Hebrew University found that most of the public thinks Channel 1 is the most reliable. It is also the least watched. Conclusion: Reliability doesn't count. The public prefers being lied to than being tormented with the painful truth.

Commentators don't recite the painful truth to the cameras like hostages with a gun to their head. They practice and present a false spectacle of reservists willing to serve two to three more years as long as the goal is achieved. They cover up the fact that the goal is deliberately vague.

• Self-defense and human shields: How should Israel wage war in Gaza?
• Israel's future is tied to the hostages' fate - and Netanyahu doesn't get it.
• With the 'perfect' rescue operation, Israel's dehumanization of Gazans reached a new low.

But the government doesn't appreciate their submissive devotion and treats the commentators like reserve soldiers. Who does it approach to report on 30 dead hostages, Alon Ben David? To whom does it send Brig-Gen. Barak Hiram to explain shelling a community center with hostages in it, Nir Dvori? No. It goes to the New York Times.

The media accepts the humiliation with its head bowed. It abandons the stage to the worthless speeches of politicians with nothing to say. Instead of information, it floods us with hostage stories and mournful harp sounds. It doesn't want to spoil the joy of releasing two hostages with the alarming number of killed Gazans.

The television studios think we're morons and that it's easy to feed us nonsense but not bad news. Bad news that is "cleared for publication" cannot be concealed with "impressive achievements" and "successes." They won't tell the truth: from now on, the war is a whim of one dangerous cynic. It would hurt the "united nation" narrative they're fostering. They don't want us to think that anyone who is killed now won't be falling in defense of the country but in defense of the government. They don't query; they hide. Instead of information, there's a snow job. A blizzard of unimportant details. This and that division moved from here to there and from there to here.

That's not relevant. That's not interesting. What is interesting? The hostages, the displaced Israelis, and the attack in Rafah.

How do we win without eliminating thousands of refugees? How do we get rid of them? We "transport" them. Sure, the brilliant minds who don't even know how to take care of 100,000 Israeli refugees "will know" how to "transport" 1.4 million Gazan refugees. Like sheep, like oranges? On the face of it, it's easy. You shower them with leaflets, telling them to transport themselves. And whoever remains? May Allah have mercy on him.

I have a suggestion for the pollster Dr. Camil Fuchs: Check whether the public supports or opposes an act in Rafah during which, say, 5,000 old people, women, and children will be killed.

The public will support it, provided they don't have to see it.

OPINION | 'HOLLYWOOD' PAGER ATTACK SENT A CLEAR MESSAGE: ISRAEL WANTS ANOTHER REDUNDANT WAR

A fire near Kiryat Shmona following a rocket attack on Wednesday. Credit: Gil Eliahu

By Gideon Levy
Haaretz Israel | Opinion
19 September 2024

We now also have it in writing, in a thousand exploding copies: Israel wants a war, a big one. There is no other way of understanding the glittering and exploding Hollywood-style operation in Lebanon other than the transmission of a determined pager message to the enemy, revealing Israel's true intentions. One thousand explosions with 3,000 injuries are an invitation to war. It will come.

Hollywood is already writing the scripts, but in reality, in contrast to action and sci-fi movies, there exists the day after. Anyone excited by exploding pagers should go to the theater because, in the real world, a clear objective should be determined for every action taken. We're not in the technology Olympics, with medals for the most fantastic operation. We are in the middle of the most criminal and redundant war Israel has ever embarked upon. And it turns out that it wants another one.

It's inconceivable that after a yearlong failed war in Gaza, which has not attained any goal or chalked up any achievement for Israel other than satisfying a lust for vengeance, Israel wants another. It's inconceivable that after Israel has paid and will continue to pay such a fateful price in the wake of the war in Gaza, it desires more war. It's unimaginable, but it's a fact.

Just like the war in Gaza, the exploding pagers in Lebanon are pointless. Compliments to the planners and executors, we've conquered Rafah and blown up the pagers; hats off to the Israel Defense Forces and Mossad, but now what?

• Pager blasts humiliated Hezbollah, but they won't win any wars for Israel
• Hezbollah pagers explode, memes erupt, but not all Israelis are laughing
• Hezbollah pager blast: Everything you need to know on Tuesday's Israel-attributed attack

Has the difficulty of the northern residents improved the other day when the pagers roared? Is Israel now in a safer place? Was the fate of the hostages improved? Did Israel's status in the world benefit? Did the Iranian threat dissipate? Did a single thing change for the better due to the latest hush-hush operation other than the already inflated egos of our security-associated people?

Just like the glorious assassinations, which never contributed anything, so do the pager heroics, which are cinematic gimmicks. Other than the drool shed in TV studios by people who salivate over every dead or wounded Arab, Israel's situation on the day after is worse than it was on the day before this heroic operation, even if people gave out sweets in Israel.

War in the north moved closer the other day at an alarming speed. It will be the most preventable war in the country's history. It could be its giant bloodbath as well. When Hezbollah explicitly states that it will stop shooting as soon as a cease-fire deal is signed with Hamas, and Israel is unwilling to stop the war in Gaza under any circumstances, it is inviting Hezbollah to attack it. That's what a war of choice looks like.

Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome air defense system over the Upper Galilee region in northern Israel on Wednesday. Credit: AFP/JALAA MAREY

If the war in Gaza worsens Israel's situation by any possible measure, the war in the north will cause a thousand-fold more damage. Gaza could become only the prelude to the disaster of the next war: the casualties, the destruction, the hostility around the world, the horror, and the hatred continuing for generations could create a situation in which we'll miss the horrific and costly battles in the Gaza neighborhood of Shujaiyeh. And this is what we want to bring upon ourselves with our own hands?

But things are more straightforward than they seem. A cease-fire in Gaza will bring a cease-fire in the north. Then we can talk about making a deal. Even if it isn't achieved, a reality without a war in the north is preferable for Israel. No one knows with certainty what we'll look like after another war. How much we'll bleed and how much we'll be beaten before we ostensibly win. Just like it would have been better if the war in Gaza had not broken out – it too was a war of choice – it would be much better if the war in the north did not happen.

Perhaps it's still possible to prevent it (which is much more doubtful after the exploding pagers). But for this to happen, Israel must abandon the belief that it can solve everything by force, with arms, with exploding pagers, with assassinations, with war. In my naivete, I believed that Israel had learned this lesson in Gaza.

On the day after the pagers, one can determine with certainty and sorrow that it hasn't, far from it.

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Making a Difference – The Means, Methods, and Mechanism for Many to Move Mountains

Photo Credit: Abraham A. van Kempen, our home away from home on the Dead Sea

By Abraham A. van Kempen
Senior Editor
Updated 19 January 2024

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