The Evangelical Pope | Grow in Unity!

Each week we let Saint Pope John Paul II share meaningful signposts to spark socio-economic resolves through justice and righteousness combined with mercy and compassion; in short, love.

               "… Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life."

               __ John 6: 68 (New International Version)

Dear young Ukrainians, God speaks from the very beginning, giving life to creation—heaven, earth, light, water, living beings, man, and woman—all exist by His word. His word brings meaning and saves us from chaos, making nature an ever-fresh reflection of divine Beauty.

God's communication with humanity exceeds even creation, revealing His presence through world events and ongoing dialogues with His image-bearers to build a relationship of love. History becomes a journey where the Creator and individuals come to know each other, aiming to guide us from sin's bondage into the freedom of love.

Dear young people, living this way makes history a path to freedom. Do you want to travel it and be part of this adventure? The future of Ukraine and the Church depends on your reply.

Dear young people, your country is transitioning to a free, democratic society. Freedom requires strong, responsible, mature consciences. It’s demanding and can be more costly than slavery!

Without God's guidance, achieving goodness is impossible. With His help, you can face challenges confidently and make tough decisions, like staying in your homeland instead of chasing illusions abroad. Young people, your presence is vital; you're called to contribute to your country's growth. Your talents are essential for your land's noble future.

Ukraine's future depends on your responsibilities. Dedicate your lives to service and prioritize the common good over personal interests, and God will bless your efforts. Ukraine needs individuals committed to serving society and advocating for everyone's rights and well-being, especially the vulnerable. True civilization is measured not only by economic growth but also by moral and spiritual progress.

In brotherhood, go your way and grow in unity to prevent traditions from causing division, instead encouraging mutual understanding and respect.

If the path is steep or challenging, recall our meeting and the enthusiasm of faith: "Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life." Repeat boldly—Christ will be your strength and joy.

The Holy Father then greeted the young people from Russia and Poland:

Thank you, young people from Russia and Poland, for being here. Please share my greetings and the joy of this reunion when you return home.

Don't despair in social or personal struggles. Focus on Christ—His face, the Teacher, Healer, Servant, Lord. See His love in His eyes. Be brave, open your heart, and let His love inspire your world and relationships. With Christ, explore your humanity and hold on to hope.

I send greetings to your families, schools, and workplaces; share them with peers. I carry you in my heart and pray you become the generation to build strong faith foundations in the third millennium.

God bless you!

Excerpted from:

Meeting With Young People ADDRESS OF THE HOLY FATHER, Lviv (Sykhiv Square), Tuesday, 26 June 2001

https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010626_ucraina-youth.html

EDITORIAL | BATTLEFIELD REALITIES AND WESTERN NARRATIVES IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Over 1.7 million Ukrainian and 70,000 Russian casualties—what is this all about?

By Abraham A. van Kempen
27 October 2025

I abhor how the clowns in Brussels collude with the stooges in Strasbourg, together with the buffoons in Washington, DC, to exploit the Ukrainian youth as cannon fodder to uphold EU-US/NATO-centric policy objectives. According to my sources, more than 1.7 million Ukrainians have been sacrificed, driven by the slogan “to the last Ukrainian.”

When I reflected on my optimism about the European Union (EU) on October 15, 2015, in A European Agenda for the World’s Stage, I beamed with pride. I am not an ordinary one-state European. I was born with a dual nationality, British and Dutch. Yes, I am more European than most. Today is my 75th birthday. While I still believe in the EU’s potential, the current group of leaders has distorted its noble goals. If Europeans don’t vote them out, we may face serious consequences.

I grew up with Eisenhour, Adenhour, Hamerstjolt, Stevenson, Brandt, and many other gifted European and American leaders during the reconstruction after World War II. I have lived to emulate them. Later in life, my family and I were honored to host Prime Minister Wim Kok and his wife, Rita, for an informal lunch and to meet an Israeli delegation plus 70 other guests at our home. I would not consider ever inviting the former Dutch PM, Mark Rutte, the current Secretary-General of NATO. My wife and I would certainly welcome President Donald J. Trump and President Vladimir Putin to meet our family.

Let’s take a close look at the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, highlighting Russia's strategic focus on gradually wearing down Ukrainian and Western resources instead of aiming for quick territorial gains. It points out differences in Western stories and support, emphasizing Russia's continued military strength and the rising challenges faced by Ukraine and Europe. The comparison between Western political motives and Russia's goal-driven tactics invites understanding. At the same time, the lack of diplomatic efforts and the rising casualties suggest that a resolution may still be possible, with Russia currently in a favorable position.

I've taken the liberty of excerpting this section from Prof. Diesen’s chat with Scott Ritter, which we'll be sharing on this Friday’s News Analysis. Do read my short A European Agenda for the World’s Stage.

Russian Military Perspective: The Reality of Conflict

Discussions with Russian officers highlight their acknowledgment of the war's difficulty, noting it's demanding and costly. Although the hardship is high, Russian losses are minor compared to Ukraine's sacrifices.

The War of Attrition: Evolving Kill Ratios

The war depends on military algorithms, initially showing Russian kill ratios of 5-7 Ukrainian losses per Russian casualty. Over time, ratios increased to 12-20 to 1, sometimes reaching 36 to 1, indicating severe Ukrainian casualties. Ukrainians occasionally gain ground, but these gains are short-lived as Russian forces often retake control, such as north of Petrovsk, where a Ukrainian counteroffensive was repelled, causing high Ukrainian losses and Russian advances.

Western Propaganda Versus Battlefield Reality

Recent commentary, such as Seymour Hersh’s piece on alleged Russian disobedience, highlights gaps between Western narratives and the facts. Despite claims of Russian hesitance, Russian forces have advanced on all fronts. Gerasimov, not Putin, issues commands; Putin provides strategic guidance but doesn’t micromanage operations. The idea that a Russian general refused a Putin order over a non-existent “horseshoe” is a Western misconception and propaganda.

Russia advances on the front, but Western perceptions often misinterpret casualty ratios, expecting quick shifts. However, this war of attrition isn't about rapid territorial gains.

Russia’s Strategic Approach

Russia’s attritional strategy targets Ukrainian forces and Western support, aiming to deplete Ukrainian manpower and weaken Western capacity to rebuild Ukraine’s military. Despite Ukraine’s mobilizations, Russia’s 2022/2023 mobilization of 300,000 men through contracts persists.

Western narratives are inconsistent—suggesting Russia is depleted of resources while also acknowledging its defense production outpaces the West four to one. Russia’s ability to destroy Western assets in Ukraine is central to its strategy.

Calendar-Driven Politics Versus Military Reality

Unlike Western politics, Russia’s strategy isn't driven by timelines but by achieving objectives. Western leaders, like Trump, focus on domestic politics, seeking Ukraine results to sway elections. Ukraine faces winter crises with threats to energy, water, and resources. Europe is economically strained, with promises and support seen as insubstantial.

Europe’s Empty Promises

European countries like Sweden are questioned over their military promises, often unfulfilled or exaggerated, revealing the unreliability of Western commitment. Meanwhile, Ukraine faces real casualties, losing thousands daily compared to Russia's hundreds. Russia's ability to sustain current war efforts gives it an advantage over Ukraine and Western allies.

Prospects for an End to the War

The war’s end date remains unknown, but the current trajectory suggests Russia will win once fighting stops.

Lack of Diplomacy and Escalating Casualties

With the war approaching a potential conclusion, the lack of diplomatic initiatives is disappointing. Usually, casualty figures rise as conflicts wind down, and this pattern is evident here. Western societies are also detached from the war's direct impacts, as their soldiers are not engaged in frontline combat.

PROF. JENNIFER KAVANAGH: INSIDE KIEV’S ELITE - PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE

Discussions within Ukraine – Perspectives from Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine continues to be driven by difficulties in negotiations, public sentiment, and battlefield conditions. Both sides are hesitant to make significant concessions due to concerns about survival.

• Media reports help maintain public support despite rising fatigue and unrest, while Ukraine faces manpower shortages that weaken its military position.
• Hope for peace depends on gradual steps, such as targeted ceasefires and economic incentives, with external influences from the U.S. and Europe remaining important but divided.
• Significant breakthroughs seem unlikely at this stage, and cautious optimism surrounds upcoming diplomatic discussions.

Watch the Video Here (1 hour, 03 minutes, 03 seconds)

Host Prof. Glenn Diesen
Substack.com
22 October 2025

Interview with Prof. Jennifer Kavanagh: Ukraine War, U.S. Policy, and Prospects for Peace

Prof. Kavanagh recently returned from Ukraine, where she met with senior government officials better to understand their political, military, and intelligence perspectives. As the war worsens, there is increasing awareness that Ukraine could collapse without progress towards a peace agreement. However, the current peace proposals are not appealing to Ukraine, making negotiations difficult.

Welcome back. Today, we are joined by Prof. Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities, and adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies. We thank Jennifer for sharing her insights.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Strategic Shifts

Jennifer Kavanagh has extensively analyzed shifts in U.S. foreign policy, especially calls to reduce America's role in Europe and the Middle East to focus more on domestic issues. These views often echo traditional pre-World War II offshore balancing, in which the U.S. sought to maintain a power equilibrium in Europe and Eurasia while avoiding foreign entanglements and resource depletion. The primary concern is that too much foreign involvement can lead to entanglement, deplete resources, and prompt other powers to oppose the U.S. rather than cooperate. Kavanagh's research highlights a revival of this strategic approach.

The State of Ukraine's War Effort

Ukraine experiences a ‘split screen’: on one side, the situation is critical, with serious concerns about the upcoming winter and numerous challenges the country faces.

Ukrainian officials openly acknowledge Ukraine's constraints, including:

• Air Defense: Ukraine has only a few months' supply of interceptors left, significantly reducing its capacity to intercept ballistic missiles and drones. As Russian attacks grow more sophisticated, Ukraine's stockpile of interceptors for defending military and civilian targets is critically low. Russian strikes on infrastructure have already caused power and water outages in cities like Kyiv.
• Manpower: Ukraine faces a critical shortage of military personnel. Many potential recruits who haven't served are hesitant to join, reducing Ukraine's capacity to strengthen the front lines. Meanwhile, Russia has gained an edge in drone warfare, disrupting Ukrainian tactics and increasing pressure on Ukrainian forces.

Constraints on a Ceasefire

Although a ceasefire is acknowledged as necessary, there is little willingness to establish one because of several major obstacles.

• Political Constraints: The proposals—such as relinquishing territory or NATO membership—are hard to justify to the Ukrainian public unless they offer clear benefits, such as EU membership or reliable security assurances. Additionally, President Zelensky faces political pressure to hold elections, which is causing internal rivalry.
• Tentative: Many people see any peace agreement as temporary, suspecting Russia's main aim is to make Ukraine a vassal state. Negotiations are perceived as existential risks, leading to doubts about signing a deal that might only delay the next conflict.
• Disconnect with Washington: A notable gap exists between Kyiv and Washington perceptions. While some Ukrainian officials think they've gained favor with U.S. politicians, that sentiment doesn’t match the mood in Washington. Unrealistic expectations, frequently promoted by European and American officials, have diverted attention from urgent issues such as air defense.

Russian and Ukrainian Red Lines and Possible Concessions

Both sides consider any ceasefire to be temporary, as neither is willing to accept terms that threaten their core interests.

For Ukraine, the key red lines are:

• EU membership is essential.
• Although NATO membership remains unlikely, Ukraine refuses to abandon it officially without proper security guarantees.
• No caps on military forces or arsenal.
• Territorial concessions remain challenging, as Ukrainian officials are hesitant to withdraw from areas not lost in combat. Meanwhile, concessions from the U.S. and Europe—like removing NATO expansion from negotiations—might help open the way for talks.
• The European Security Architecture

Russia's main concerns are NATO’s expansion into Ukraine and what it sees as the derusification of the country. Russia insists on more than just Ukraine's neutrality; it also wants an end to anti-Russian policies, such as language and cultural laws. For any agreement to last, these issues must be resolved.

Challenges in Negotiations

Trust is deeply lacking on both sides, with past compromises viewed as precursors to escalation. Russia and Ukraine each perceive existential threats. While the U.S. and Europe might act as mediators, divergent views on Russia’s security worries hinder progress. The Biden administration was reluctant to acknowledge Russian concerns, but the current U.S. government appears more open to engaging on these matters.

Prospects for Peace and Ceasefire

Prof. Kavanagh proposes that, instead of aiming for a comprehensive grand bargain, focusing on smaller, feasible measures—such as an energy ceasefire—might be more effective. This approach could lower costs for both parties and lessen U.S. engagement in targeting.

Ultimately, the outcome of the war will be determined by negotiations and the situation on the Eastern Front, rather than by further escalation.

Ukraine’s leadership is open to discussing specific ceasefires, such as for air or maritime domains, but these would likely need to be balanced with other concessions, possibly in economic or political areas.

Media Narratives and Public Opinion

Media narratives in Europe and Ukraine tend to highlight optimistic or misleading images of the war to maintain public backing. In Ukraine, despite genuine war fatigue and growing support for negotiations, many concessions still face public resistance. Protests and unrest are on the rise, yet the population might punish leaders who accept an unfavorable peace. Therefore, any peace agreement must be presented as imposed rather than voluntarily accepted to prevent political backlash.

Manpower and Battlefield Realities

Ukraine faces significant challenges in recruiting, desertion, and sustaining morale. Prof. Kavanagh notes that up to 250,000 Ukrainians have deserted the military. Millions have emigrated to Western Europe or Russia, and mobilization efforts are struggling to keep pace with the losses and demands. Although some hope that freezing the conflict could allow for rebuilding, this appears unlikely given current trends and shortages in air defenses and other supplies.

Expectations for Upcoming U.S.-Russia Talks

With a potential meeting between President Putin and President Trump on the horizon, expectations are cautious. Although Trump’s sincere desire for peace is evident, there is no concrete plan in place to realize it. Both nations seem to be relying on battlefield developments to prompt negotiations. Until then, limited measures like targeted ceasefires or economic incentives might be the most practical approaches.

Conclusion

The road to peace in Ukraine continues to be hindered by political, military, and diplomatic hurdles. Existential fears drive both parties, and they are hesitant to make concessions that might weaken their stance. External players, such as the U.S. and Europe, wield considerable influence but have differing interests and approaches. Achieving progress may rely on gradual efforts and confidence-building actions rather than an immediate comprehensive agreement.

The conflict in Ukraine continues to be driven by difficulties in negotiations, public sentiment, and battlefield conditions. Both sides are hesitant to make significant concessions due to concerns about survival. Media reports help maintain public support despite rising fatigue and unrest, while Ukraine faces manpower shortages that weaken its military position.

Hope for peace depends on gradual steps, such as targeted ceasefires and economic incentives, with external influences from the U.S. and Europe remaining important but divided. Significant breakthroughs seem unlikely at this stage, and cautious optimism surrounds upcoming diplomatic discussions.

Follow Prof. Jennifer Kavanagh’s Work

Those interested in Prof. Jennifer Kavanagh’s analysis and research can find more information on the Defense Priorities homepage or by following her on Twitter at J.E. Kavanagh.

GUEST EDITORIAL | TO THE LAST UKRAINIAN?

The West and Kiev are once again stranding Ukraine in the forever kill zone.

Over 1.7 million Ukrainian and 70,000 Russian casualties—what is this all about?

There appeared to be hope for peace—if only for a fleeting moment. How false that hope proved to be. I know this well because I was cautiously optimistic when we learned just over a week ago that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump had a lengthy, productive phone call and intended to meet in person once more.

The upcoming “Alaska 2.0" summit in Budapest has been canceled before being officially scheduled, further straining Russian-American relations. Washington has imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, which had not been sanctioned before, along with dozens of their subsidiaries. This is coupled with what appears to be intentionally condescending and offensive rhetoric that blames Russia and its president solely for the ongoing deadlock in negotiations to end the Ukraine War, which is seen as a Western proxy conflict against Russia.

In reality, it is Washington that keeps making U-turns, disrupting what could have been a rational, albeit challenging, peace process. For example, Trump and his team have oscillated between insisting Ukraine surrender territory not yet controlled by Russia and returning to the previous stance — before the Alaska summit — that a ceasefire should come before achieving complete peace.

Furthermore, the Trump administration has been largely ambiguous about another escalation. Trump has denied it somewhat implausibly, but it appears that Washington has allowed Kiev to launch long-range strikes using European missiles—particularly the British Storm Shadow—that contain US components and utilize American targeting data. This represents another significant and provocative escalation.

The only remaining restraint in Washington is the decision not to send Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine, facilitated by eager NATO-EU Europe. However, considering the brief yet disappointing track record of the second Trump administration, this refusal should not be viewed as reliable or permanent. Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky has already claimed he has “not yet" obtained the Tomahawks. Trump's apparent enjoyment in being portrayed as unpredictable and manipulated by Zelensky, who often publicly humiliates him, highlights the unusual dynamics of their relationship.

The NATO-EU Europeans have also delayed their ambitious plan to provide an interest-free “loan” — which isn't quite the right term for money that will not be repaid —of another 140 billion euros, using frozen Russian assets as pseudo-collateral.

The term "Pseudo" is used because, in reality, EU taxpayers will ultimately bear the financial burden. Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has openly acknowledged this, although his statement was made in a context most of his voters wouldn't notice and was deliberately phrased to be confusing. He said that "budgetary guarantees from member states […] will be replaced by collateralization under the EU’s long-term budget.” In other words, EU citizens will pay, but the process is disguised, so they might not realize it.

Currently, the EU's inability to agree on how to distribute the substantial financial and political risks of this double-steal—originating from Russia and EU taxpayers—combined with Ukraine’s blatant demand to receive funds without scrutiny, has delayed the scheme's implementation. Similar to the US's reluctance to send Tomahawk missiles to Kiev, this hesitancy is a leftover of rationality that may soon fade. The new deadline for a decision is set for December. If East European hardliners and Russophobes, like Poland’s Donald “I love terror attacks on vital infrastructure as long as they hit Germany” Tusk, continue to influence the tone, the “loan” plan to undermine the EU’s credibility might proceed shortly.

The EU remains committed to measures that extend a brutal conflict for Ukrainians and harm the economy and well-being of the residents of NATO-EU countries. The 19th sanctions package has been introduced, employing strong tactics to pressure dissenters within the EU—such as Hungary and Slovakia—to accept a complete halt of Russian gas and oil supplies. These tactics might already involve more sabotage, similar to the Nord Stream attacks, with refineries processing Russian oil exploding at an increasing rate.

In summary, although the official Kiev might celebrate, the reality for Ukraine and its people is grim: With the US returning to a proxy-war stance and the EU unwilling to shift away from it, the conflict is likely to persist into next year. Unless there are significant setbacks, Ukraine can expect a harsh winter and, subsequently, another year of fighting, with renewed Russian offensives expected.

Meanwhile, NATO figurehead and pro-Trump supporter Mark Rutte, comfortably seated next to his US boss, essentially stated that he doesn't care that less than a quarter of Ukrainians want the war to continue. Former Polish prime minister Leszek Miller suggests sending young male Ukrainians who fled to Poland to the front lines.

In short, the flow of cannon fodder must continue.

The West began its reckless policy of openly supporting Ukraine at the 2008 Bucharest summit, almost 20 years ago. Despite witnessing a disastrous outcome, this course remains unchanged. The aggressive strategy of sacrificing Ukraine to weaken Russia persists. Even as it fails, the escalation continues, much like compulsive gamblers who cannot stop until they lose everything. Ukraine’s tragedy is that its land and people are the stakes in this gamble.

Tarik Cyril Amar, PhD, is a distinguished historian and expert in international politics. He holds a BA in Modern History from Oxford, an MSc in International History from LSE, and a PhD from Princeton. His scholarships include the Holocaust Memorial Museum and Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. He was also director of the Center for Urban History in Lviv, Ukraine. Originally German, he has lived in the UK, Ukraine, Poland, the US, and Turkey.

Dr. Amar’s book, 'The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv,' was published by Cornell in 2015. He's working on a study about Cold War TV spy stories and a new volume on Ukraine's international response. He has shared insights in interviews, including on Rania Khalek Dispatches and Breakthrough News.

WHY THE UKRAINE CRISIS IS THE WEST’S FAULT

The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

By John J. Mearsheimer
R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Chicago.
Foreign Affairs September/October 2014
Published on 18 August 2014

Annotated by Abraham A. van Kempen

The typical Western viewpoint attributes the Ukraine crisis primarily to Russian aggression. Many Western officials think that Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea to reestablish the Soviet empire and might also pursue control over the rest of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries. The ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 is seen as merely a pretext for Putin’s actions.

However, this interpretation is deeply flawed. The United States and its European allies hold significant responsibility for the crisis. The leading cause is NATO's expansion, a part of a broader strategy to remove Ukraine from Russia’s influence and bring it closer to Western institutions.

Furthermore, the eastward expansion of the European Union and Western backing of Ukraine’s pro-democracy movement, starting with the Orange Revolution in 2004, have greatly influenced this dynamic. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leadership has consistently opposed NATO's expansion and made clear that it would not accept Ukraine becoming a Western outpost.

For President Putin, the fall of Ukraine’s democratically elected, pro-Russian government—often labeled a “coup”—was the final trigger. He reacted by annexing Crimea, fearing it might serve as a NATO military base, and started trying to destabilize Ukraine to prevent its pro-Western goals.

Putin’s reaction was foreseeable. As the West encroached on Russia’s strategic domains and threatened its core interests—something Putin has long emphasized—his response was anticipated. Western leaders, however, made a misjudgment, clinging to an outdated perspective of international relations. They thought that traditional realism no longer mattered in the 21st century and believed that Europe could remain peaceful and united through liberal values such as the rule of law, economic ties, and democracy.

This primary strategy failed in Ukraine. The crisis shows that realpolitik remains essential, and neglecting it is risky. U.S. and European leaders erred in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western fortress on Russia’s border. Persisting with this flawed approach would lead to even greater errors.

The Western Affront

Following the Cold War's conclusion, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and that NATO retain control over Germany. They opposed NATO's expansion and believed Western diplomats understood their position. However, by the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration opposed this view and began promoting NATO expansion.

NATO's first wave of expansion happened in 1999 with the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In 2004, additional members included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Russia consistently opposed these enlargements. During NATO’s 1995 bombing of Bosnia, Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that expanding NATO toward Russia’s borders might lead to a broader European conflict. At that time, Russia was too weak to resist NATO’s eastward expansion, especially since most new members did not share borders with Russia, apart from the small Baltic states.

Later, NATO considered expanding eastward. At the 2008 Bucharest summit, the alliance discussed the possibility of admitting Georgia and Ukraine. While the U.S. supported this, France and Germany opposed it, concerned that it could provoke Russia. The resulting agreement did not start the formal membership process but indicated that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually join NATO.

Russia viewed this as a significant threat. Officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko and President Putin cautioned that admitting Georgia and Ukraine to NATO would directly threaten Russia. After Georgia's attempts in 2008 to reintegrate its breakaway regions, Russia intervened militarily, demonstrating its resolve to prevent NATO’s expansion.

The EU expanded eastward by establishing the Eastern Partnership in 2008, aiming to promote prosperity and integrate nations such as Ukraine into the EU economy. Russian leaders perceived this as hostile and a sign of NATO's expansion. In February 2014, before Yanukovych’s ousting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of attempting to build a “sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe.

The West supported democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries, often providing funding to pro-Western groups. In 2013, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland stated that the U.S. had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve a better future. The National Endowment for Democracy funded various initiatives to build civil society and oppose Yanukovych after his 2010 election victory. Russian leaders feared that Western-influenced social engineering in Ukraine might eventually threaten Russia itself.

Creating a Crisis

The expansion of NATO, the growth of the EU, and Western efforts to promote democracy contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The immediate trigger occurred in November 2013 when Yanukovych rejected an EU economic agreement in favor of a Russian proposal, sparking protests that eventually led to his ousting. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and included several officials with far-right backgrounds.

Although the full scope of U.S. involvement remains unclear, it is evident that Washington favored regime change. Nuland and Senator John McCain took part in protests against the government, and U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt commended Yanukovych’s ousting. A leaked phone call showed Nuland supporting Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s appointment as prime minister, which eventually happened. Many Russians suspect that the West orchestrated Yanukovych’s toppling, prompting Putin to order the Crimea annexation, a move supported by Russian troops and a significant ethnic Russian population seeking independence from Ukraine.

Putin then increased pressure on Ukraine's new government to prevent its alignment with the West. He backed separatists in eastern Ukraine and warned of possible military escalation. He also took economic actions by raising gas prices and demanding payment for prior energy supplies.

The Diagnosis

From a geopolitical perspective, Putin’s actions make sense. Ukraine, a flat region historically serving as an invasion route into Russia, is a vital buffer state. No Russian leader would accept a hostile military alliance forming in Ukraine. Similarly, the U.S. wouldn't accept foreign military alliances near its borders, as shown during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Russian officials have repeatedly warned the West that NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine is unacceptable, a position confirmed by the 2008 conflict with Georgia.

Western officials claim they tried to reassure Russia by using measures like the NATO-Russia Council and changing missile defense deployments. Nonetheless, these efforts were unsuccessful because Russia alone decides what it views as a security threat.

The root of the West’s misjudgment stems from the Clinton administration’s attempt to expand NATO in the mid-1990s. While both supporters and critics debated the policy, many realist opponents worried it would provoke Russia. George Kennan, a diplomat, called NATO expansion a “tragic mistake” with no justification.

Liberals thought the end of the Cold War changed global relations, making the U.S. appear as a benign hegemon. They aimed to advance democracy and economic ties, believing Russia wouldn't see this as a threat. This liberal view strongly influenced U.S. policy, with little opposition from realists. Leaders like President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry supported liberal ideals, in contrast to Putin’s realist stance. This difference unintentionally led the West to provoke the Ukraine crisis.

Blame Game

As Kennan predicted, critics of NATO expansion often blame it for Russia’s aggression. Western officials frequently describe Putin as irrational or liken him to historical aggressors like Hitler, asserting that Russia seeks to rebuild an empire. Yet, there is little proof that Putin intended to take Crimea or other Ukrainian areas before Yanukovych’s downfall. Russia lacks the military and economic power to occupy and hold Ukraine, and history shows such occupations rarely succeed. Overall, Putin’s moves appear more defensive than aggressive.

A Way Out

Most Western leaders view Russia’s actions as unjustified security concerns, prompting them to reinforce existing policies and impose new sanctions. However, these sanctions are unlikely to change Russia’s behavior, especially since European countries are reluctant to escalate economic measures that might harm their own interests. History shows that states are prepared to endure considerable hardship to protect their core interests.

The West continues to pursue its provocative policies. U.S. officials reaffirm their backing for Ukraine’s pro-Western stance, while the EU moves forward with its association agreement. NATO keeps welcoming new members, including Ukraine, and has taken steps to strengthen Ukraine’s military, which Russia views as a threat.

A sustainable solution requires a fresh approach. The West should stop trying to westernize Ukraine and instead support its neutrality, as Austria did during the Cold War. Western leaders need to acknowledge Ukraine’s importance to Russia and avoid supporting an openly anti-Russian government. The goal should be a sovereign, non-aligned Ukraine, not a Russian satellite or NATO outpost.

The West should definitively exclude NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine and instead prioritize developing an economic plan for Ukraine involving the EU, IMF, Russia, and the U.S. Social engineering efforts in Ukraine should be limited, with particular attention to safeguarding minority rights, especially those of Russian speakers. While some fear that altering the current approach might damage U.S. credibility, persisting with a flawed strategy would incur greater costs. Recognizing mistakes and formulating improved policies would enhance, rather than diminish, respect for the West.

Some argue Ukraine should choose its own alliances, but realpolitik often outweighs this. For example, the U.S. declined Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, and Russia sees Ukraine’s possible NATO membership as similarly unacceptable. Ukraine must take these geopolitical considerations into account when engaging with its influential neighbor.

While Ukraine has the right to seek NATO or EU membership, the West isn't obligated to accept, as Ukraine’s defense isn't a vital Western interest. Admitting Ukraine into NATO without guaranteeing its defense would be irresponsible.

Continuing with current policies may cause problems, weakening cooperation with Russia on global issues like Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria. The U.S. will need Russia’s support later, especially regarding China, but current policies are driving Moscow and Beijing closer together.

The United States and its allies must choose: continue current policies and risk increasing tensions, or back a stable, neutral Ukraine that doesn't threaten Russia and might improve relations with Moscow. The second choice presents the best chance for positive results for all parties.

Conclusion

This essay argues that Western efforts to include Ukraine in NATO and the EU have escalated tensions with Russia, raising the likelihood of conflict and instability.

It suggests that the West change its approach by backing Ukraine as a neutral buffer state instead of pushing for its westernization.

The author observes that imposing harsh sanctions or taking provocative actions is unlikely to change Russia’s stance. Instead, they stress the importance of engaging with Russia on global matters. A new strategy focused on Ukrainian neutrality could benefit everyone and help repair relations between the West and Moscow.