Zionism on the brink: The Gaza war beyond Netanyahu

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (L), Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces Herzi Halevi (R) follow the attack by Israeli warplanes Hudaydah Port in Yemen from the operations centre in Jerusalem on 20 July 2024. [Israeli Prime Minister’s Office /Anadolu Agency]

The idea that Israel’s war on Gaza is essentially waged and sustained by and for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has dominated political analyses on the subject for some time. The notion is often kept alive by public opinion inside Israel. Most polls produced since the start of the Israeli genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza suggest that an overwhelming majority of Israelis believe that Netanyahu’s decisions are motivated by personal, political and familial interests.

"Initially, the Hamas-led assault and its aftermath posed a challenge
to all segments of Israeli society:
the humiliated army, the degraded intelligence agencies, the humbled politicians, the confounded media, and the angry masses.

The greatest challenge was faced by the far-right, though, which was about to shape the future of Israel for generations.

Thus, the Gaza war is not just important to Netanyahu but to the very future of Israel’s far-right camp, whose entire political and ideological program has been shattered, most likely beyond salvation.”

This conclusion, however, is too convenient and not entirely accurate. It assumes, wrongly, that the Israeli people oppose Netanyahu’s war in Gaza whereas, in reality, they have been quite approving of all tactics used by the Israeli army so far. For example, over 300 days into the war, 69 percent of all Israelis support Netanyahu’s desperate assassinations, including the murder of the top political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in Tehran on 31 July. While Netanyahu’s decision to target a political leader reflects his failure and desperation, how do we explain the Israeli people’s enthusiasm for the expansion of the circle of violence?

The answer does not lie in events on 7 October, namely the cross-border Palestinian incursion in the Gaza Envelope region and the unprecedented defeat of the Israeli army. Indeed, it is time to start thinking beyond the confines of the revenge theory, which has dominated our understanding and analysis of the Israeli genocide in Gaza.

For years prior to the current war, Israel has been moving slowly to the political right and far right, the political extremism of which has surpassed that of any generation of Zionist leaders who have governed the occupation state since the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in 1948. According to an Israeli Democracy Institute poll published in January last year, 73 percent of Israeli Jews aged between 18 and 24, identify as “right wing”. Given that the likes of current Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich, and Orit Strook are also classified as “right-wing”, we can conclude that the majority of young Israelis identify in every practical sense as right-wing extremists.

It is these young people who form the core of the Israeli army and the settler movement.

They are the people carrying out the genocide in Gaza and the daily pogroms in the occupied West Bank, and serving as the foot soldiers for the widespread racism campaigns targeting the Palestinian Arab communities inside Israel.

A good number of analysts have tried to explain how Israel became a decidedly right-wing society and how young people, in particular, have emerged as the gatekeepers of Israel’s version of suicidal nationalism. The explanation, however, should be straightforward. Israel’s far-right extremism is simply the natural evolution of Zionist ideology which, even in its most “liberal” forms, was always predicated on ethnic hatred, a sense of racial supremacy and predictable violence.

Although ideological Zionism in all its manifestations has essentially followed the same trajectory of settler-colonialism and ethnic cleansing, a conflict existed between the various strands of Israeli society. The so-called liberals – represented by the upper echelons of the military, business circles and some centrist and leftist political groups – worked to maintain the balance between a colonial, apartheid regime in occupied Palestine, and a selective liberal order that applies only to Jews inside Israel.

The far right had other ideas. For many years, the Israeli right-wing camp, led by Netanyahu himself, has perceived his ideological enemies within Israel as traitors for even daring to engage in a “peace process” with the Palestinians, even if that process was a facade from the beginning. The right wanted to ensure that the territorial contiguity between so-called “Israel proper” and the illegal Jewish settlements was not only physical, but also ideological. This is how the settlers moved slowly, over the years, from the margins of Israeli politics to the centre.

Between April 2019 and November 2022, Israel underwent five general elections. Although the focus of most remained fixated on Netanyahu’s role in dividing Israeli society, the elections, in reality, were a historic fight among Israel’s ideological groups to determine the future of the country and the direction of Zionism.

In the last election in 2022, the far-right extremists won, forming the most stable Israeli government in years. While the right was ready to reconfigure Israel permanently, including its political, educational, military and, most importantly, judicial institutions, 7 October happened.

Initially, the Hamas-led assault and its aftermath posed a challenge to all segments of Israeli society: the humiliated army, the degraded intelligence agencies, the humbled politicians, the confounded media and the angry masses. The greatest challenge was faced by the far-right, though, which was about to shape the future of Israel for generations. Thus, the Gaza war is not just important to Netanyahu, but to the very future of Israel’s far-right camp, whose entire political and ideological program has been shattered, most likely beyond salvation.

This should help explain the obvious contradictions in Israeli society. For example, the mistrust in Netanyahu’s motives, yet trust in the war itself; the widespread criticism of his overall failure, yet the approval of his actions; and so on. This seeming confusion cannot be explained simply based on Netanyahu’s ability to manipulate Israelis. Even if the Israeli right has lost all faith in Netanyahu, without him as a unifying figure the chances for the far-right camp to redeem itself are lost, as is the very future of Zionism.